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DALE V. BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA AND
MONMOUTH COUNCIL: NEW JERSEY'S
ATFEMPT TO DEFINE PLACES OF PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATION AND REMEDY THE
"CANCER OF DISCRIMINATION"
Michelle L. Carusone
The Boy Scouts is as different from the facilities listed (as places
of public accommodation) in Title II (of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act) as dogs are from cats.'
Boy Scouts is a "public accommodation," not simply because of
its solicitation activities, but also because it maintains close rela-
tionships with federal and state governmental bodies and with
other recognized public accommodations.2
These contradictory statements reflect the conflict that has been well-
visited in state and federal courts: the contention between an organiza-
tion's right to choose its members and an individual's right to become a
member of an organization.3 Entrenched in this issue is the tension be-
tween the organization's freedom of expression, as some would argue
that member selection is a form of expression,4 and the prospective
member's freedom of association! Courts' interpretations of accommo-
dation statutes have resulted in disparate rulings and conflicting treat-
'J.D. candidate, May 2001, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1012 (1993) (Welsh IV).
2. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1211 (N.J. 1999) (Dale II).
3. Compare Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 621 (1984) (holding that
the United States Jaycees could not exclude women from its membership), with Cornelius
v. Benevolent Protective Order of the Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1203 (D. Conn. 1974)
(finding that the Elks could restrict their membership to white males by strictly limiting
membership).
4. See Andrew M. Perlman, Public Accommodation Laws and the Dual Nature of
the Freedom of Association, 8 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 111, 127-28 (1998) (positing
that group membership policies have communicative value).
5. See id. at 113 (recognizing the "fundamental tension" between the right of asso-
ciation and the quest for equality).
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ment of the same entity in different jurisdictions.6 The varying results are
dependent on a particular court's evaluation of what constitutes a "place
of public accommodation"7 under the applicable state or federal statute.8
This issue was revisited in August 1999, when the Supreme Court of
New Jersey interpreted the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
(LAD)9 to include the Boy Scouts as a place of public accommodation in
Dale v. Boy Scouts of America and Monmouth Council, Boy Scouts of
America.0 The court held that the designation of the organization as a
place of public accommodation prevented the Boy Scouts from denying
membership to homosexual individuals."
This Comment examines the Supreme Court of New Jersey's treat-
ment of the Boy Scouts of America under its public accommodation
statute in relation to preceding decisions. First, this Comment considers
the language of the applicable public accommodation statute in these
cases and the legislative intent supporting it. Then, this Comment con-
templates the impact the construction of the statute had on its interpreta-
tion. Finally, this Comment argues that the disparity among the deci-
sions dealing with public accommodation statutes thwarts the goal of
6. Compare Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218,
220 (Cal. 1998) (Curran Ii) (holding that the Boy Scouts of America is not a public ac-
commodation under California's statute), with Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of Am.,
Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352, 357-58
(Conn. 1987) (finding that the Boy Scouts is a public accommodation under Connecticut's
statute).
7. See Lisa Gabrielle Lerman & Annette K. Sanderson, Project, Discrimination in
Access to Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodation Laws,
7 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 215, 217 (1978) (defining public accommodation as "a
term of art which was developed by the drafters of discrimination laws to refer to places
other than schools, work places, and homes").
8. See id. at 217.
The scope of traditional public accommodations laws is defined by a narrow con-
cept of what places would be open to the public, based on the common law obli-
gation of innkeepers and "common carriers" to admit all travelers. The current
view is so much broader, however, that the use of the word "accommodations" is
a misnomer; any establishment which offers goods and services of any kind to the
public may now be covered. The modern concept is limited to coverage of es-
tablishments which operate from a particular place, but the laws could be ex-
panded to include services which are performed at the home or office of the
buyer, or goods which are sold in the street.
Id. at 218 (footnotes omitted).
9. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1 to -49 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).
10. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1230 (N.J. 1999) (Dale II).
11. See id. at 1230. A public accommodation may not deny any person "accommoda-
tions, advantages, facilities, and privileges;" N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4, and the Dale II
court found that membership fell into this enumeration of benefits. See Dale H, 734 A.2d
at 1230.
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ending discrimination, and that only more uniformity between statutes
will further the goal of eradicating invidious discrimination. 2
I. FROM HOTELS TO MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATIONS: THE EVOLUTION
OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION STATUTES
Legal scholars generally state that public accommodation statutes stem
from the common law duty of innkeepers and common carriers to refrain
from discriminating as they offered their services to the general public. 3
Congress passed the first Civil Rights Act in 1866, which defined who
were citizens of the United States, and provided all citizens with the right
to contract, sue, inherit, and deal in real and personal property without
regard to race or color. 4 Courts interpreted the 1866 Act to apply to pri-
12. On January 14, 2000, the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the BSA's
appeal. See Dale II, 734 A.2d at 1196, cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3447, 3449, 3450 (U.S.
Jan. 18, 2000) (No. 99-699). The Court held oral arguments on April 26, 2000. See Joan
Biskupic, Ex-Scout's Day in Court; Group Ousted Leader, Arguing Homosexuality Con-
tradicts Moral Code, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2000, at A3. The issue before the Court is
whether requiring the BSA to admit an openly gay assistant leader violates the organiza-
tion's First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and freedom of association. See
Telephone Interview with Charles Schmitz, Intern, Clerk's Office of the United States Su-
preme Court, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 7, 1999); see also infra notes 186-88 and accompa-
nying text. Although this author recognizes the importance of the constitutional issues
raised by Dale, this Comment instead focuses on Dale as an example of why state public
accommodation laws are problematic and warrant modification. See infra Part III.
13. See Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc. v. Commission on Human
Rights and Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352, 357 (Conn. 1987) (citing J. Story, BAILMENTS
§§ 466a, 470, 476(2) (1846)); W. Jones, BAILMENTS § 94c (1828); Lerman & Sanderson,
supra note 7, at 218; Matthew 0. Tobriner & Joseph R. Grodin, The Individual and the
Public Service Enterprise in the New Industrial State, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1249-50
(1967). But see Joseph William Singer, No Right To Exclude: Public Accommodations and
Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283, 1294-95 (1996) (arguing that before the Civil
War, it was not apparent that only innkeepers and common carriers had a duty to serve
the public). Professor Singer reports:
Although the law was ambiguous, there is a substantial argument that the duty to
serve the public extended to all businesses that held themselves out as open to
the public. Only around the time of the Civil War did this rule begin formally to
narrow, and only after the Civil War, when civil rights were extended to African-
Americans for the first time, did the courts clearly state.., that most businesses
had no common-law duties to serve the public.
Id.
14. See Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.). The Act stated:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to
20001
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vate as well as to public acts." Although the Act did not expressly ex-
empt private organizations from its coverage, courts have found an im-
plied exemption of private organizations in the 1866 Act 16 since passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17
The 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination and segregation
on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin in any place of
public accommodation." The 1964 Civil Rights Act's definition of a
public accommodation includes "[e]stablishments affecting interstate
commerce or supported in their activities by State action"' 9 and other
specifically enumerated facilities, including inns, hotels, restaurants, cafe-
terias, theaters, and gas stations.0
Since 1865, most states have also promulgated public accommodation
statutes in some form.2' None of these statutes is identical in coverage,
but among them are prohibitions of discrimination on the basis of race,
sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and con-
vey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other,
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstand-
ing.
Id. § 3, 14 Stat. at 27. One commentator argues that the Supreme Court has never found
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to be a general public accommodation statute. See Singer,
supra note 13, at 1289. This is attributable to the conceptualization of the duty of a public
accommodation, which is to allow everyone to enter its property. See id. The right to en-
ter property is not included in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982. See id.
15. See Margaret E. Koppen, The Private Club Exemption from Civil Rights Legisla-
tion-Sanctioned Discrimination or Justified Protection of Right to Associate?, 20 PEPP. L.
REV. 643, 645 (1993); see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438-39 (1968)
(expanding the Act to cover private real estate transactions); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24,
31 (1948) (determining initially the scope of the statute as applicable to governmental ac-
tion only).
16. See Koppen, supra note 15, at 645-46 & n.25 (citing Cornelius v. Benevolent Pro-
tective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1201 (D. Conn. 1974), which applied by implica-
tion the 1964 Act's exemption of private clubs to the 1866 Act).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-d, 2000a to 2000h-6 (1994).
18. See id.; see also infra note 47 (setting out the text of the Act).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1994).
20. See id. at § 2000a(b)(1)-(4) (1994); see also infra note 47 (setting out the text of
the Act).
21. See Singer, supra note 13, at 1374. Massachusetts passed the first public accom-
modation statute in 1865, followed by Pennsylvania in 1867, "South Carolina (1869 and
1870), Tennessee (1967), and between 1868 and 1873 Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Louisi-
ana, Texas and Arkansas." Id. In 1873, New York passed a Civil Rights Act. See id.
Iowa passed a statute in 1884, followed by New Jersey (1884), Ohio (1884), Colorado
(1885), Indiana (1885), Michigan (1885), Minnesota (1885), Nebraska (1885), Rhode Is-
land (1885), Washington (1889-1890), California (1893), Wisconsin (1895), and Connecti-
cut (1905). See id.
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national origin, religion, sex, disability, sexual orientation, marital status,
or a combination thereof.22 Further, most state statutes, along with the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, exempt private clubs from their scope. 13 Or-
ganizations, including swimming clubs, day camps, and membership as-
sociations, often raise the private club exemption as a defense in lawsuits,
forcing courts to determine whether those establishments are indeed pri-
22. See id. at 1478-95 (indexing the state laws by areas of coverage); see also Koppen,
supra note 15, at 647-48, n.37 (noting that as of 1993, 44 states and the District of Colum-
bia, along with Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, had promulgated public accommoda-
tion statutes in some form). See generally ALA. CODE §§ 21-7-1 to -10 (1997); ALASKA
STAT. §§ 18.80.200-.295 (Michie 1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1441 to -1442 (West
1999); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51-53 (West 1982 & Supp. 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-34-
601 to -605 (1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. §3 46a-63 to -64 (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§
4501-12 (1999); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501 to -2505, 1-2511, 1-2519, 1-2541 to -2557
(1999); FLA. STAT. ch 760.01 to 760.11 (1997); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 489-1 to -8 (1993 &
Supp. 1998); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7301 to -7303 (1997); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-101 to
-103 (1998); IND. CODE. §§ 22-9-1-1 to -18 (1998); IOWA CODE §§ 216.1-.18 (1999); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1001 to -1019 (1993 & Supp. 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 344.120 to .145 (Michie 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:146, 51:2232, 51:2247,
51:2248 (West 1987 & Supp. 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4551 to 4594-F (West
1989 & Supp. 1999); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 5-13 (1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98, ch. 151B, § 4 (West 1990 & Supp. 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
37.2301-.2304 (West 1985 & Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01-.021 (1998); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 97-23-17 (1999); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 213.010-.112 (1994 & Supp. 1998);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-304 to -305 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-132 to -143 (1997 &
Supp. 1998); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 651.050-.120 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:1
to -A:26 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:1-2 to -10 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 28-1-1 to -15 (Michie 1996); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 40-45 (McKinney 1992);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-14-04 to -05 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01-.02,
4112.022-.051 (Anderson 1998); OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, §§ 1401-1402 (1991); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 30.670-.685 (1997); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 952-963 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-24-1 to -8 (1994 & Supp. 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-9-10 to -120
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 20-13-1 to -25 (Michie 1995); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-101 to -102, -201 to -312, -501 to -503, -801 to -905 (1998); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 13-7-1 to -4 (1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4501-4507 (1993); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 2.1-714 to -725 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1999); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.60.010 to
.401 (1998 & Supp. 1999); W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-1 to -20 (1999); WiS. STAT.
§§ 106.04-.08 (1995/96); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-9-101 to -103 (Michie 1999); P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 1, §§ 13-19 (1982); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1-11 (1998).
23. See Koppen, supra note 15, at 649 n.44 (noting that, as of 1993, approximately 30
state statutes specifically exempted private clubs). These states include: Arizona, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virgin Islands, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See
id.; see also supra note 22 (listing the relevant state statutes). Further, California courts
have implied that the California Unruh Act exempts private clubs. See Curran v. Mount
Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 334-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1.983)
(Curran [) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51-51.5); see also infra Part I.B.2 (detailing the pro-
gression of the Curran case through the Supreme Court of California).
2000]
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vate.24  These cases have not conceived a bright-line test to define
whether an organization is private; they have only provided factors to
consider, such as the size of the organization, and its membership selec-
21tion process.
A. The Boy Scouts of America's Standards
The Boy Scouts of America (Boy Scouts or BSA) is a congressionally
chartered corporation with approximately four million boys and more
than one million adults among its members. 27  The Boy Scouts recruit
members through national television, radio, and magazine campaigns,
and local membership drives, including "School Nights," which are held
at school facilities and are organized in conjunction with schools across
the nation.28 National, regional, and local entities manage the organiza-
tion, with the National Council as the highest governing body.29 The Na-
tional Council oversees regional committees that preside over area
committees, which the BSA further divides into over 400 local councils
nationwide, comprised of district committees.0 The BSA grants unit
charters to individual sponsors within the districts, and units are grouped
according to age level of the members." Individual sponsors are gener-
24. See, e.g., Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1206 (N.J. 1999) (Dale 11);
Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 227-39 (Cal.
1998) (Curran II). New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination (LAD) excepts "distinctly
private" organizations: "Nothing herein contained shall be construed to include or to ap-
ply to any institution, bona fide club, or place of public accommodation, which is in its na-
ture distinctly private." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-51 (West 1993) (emphasis added).
25. See Dale H, 734 A.2d at 1213-17 (considering the solicitation of a broad member-
ship base in relation to an organization's selectivity, and an organization's failure to limit
its maximum membership as relevant criteria for determining whether the organization is
"distinctly private" under the LAD). The court, however, refrained from stating that
there are established criteria for such a determination. See id.; cf. Welsh v. Boy Scouts of
Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1276 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Landsdowne Swim Club,
713 F. Supp. 785, 796-97 (E.D. Pa. 1989) as providing the factors involved in considering
the private club exemption under Title II). These factors are: "(1) the genuine selectivity
of the group; (2) the membership's control over the operations of the establishment;
(3) the history of the organization; (4) the use of facilities by nonmembers; (5) the club's
purpose; (6) whether the club advertises for members; and (7) whether the club is non-
profit or for profit." Id.
26. See Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 787 F. Supp. 1511, 1514 (N.D. I11. 1992) (Welsh
III). The charter was granted pursuant to Title 36, §§ 21-29 of the United States Code. See
id.
27. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., A Right to Be Wrong, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 16, 1999, at 17.
28. See Dale If, 734 A.2d at 1200-01.
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ally existing organizations such as religious, civic, or educational groups,
including schools, local governmental entities such as law enforcement
agencies, fire departments, city governments, and the military.1
2
The Boy Scouts sell books, uniforms, badges, and camping equipment,
among other scouting materials, referring to such sales as "supply opera-
tions. 3 3 Some Councils also receive a portion of their operating funds
from the United Way.34
In 1978, the BSA prepared a position paper stating that an avowed
homosexual may be neither a volunteer scout leader nor a registered unit
member, but it never distributed the paper.35 The BSA wrote additional
statements in 1991 and 1993 expressing similar positions after cases in
several states charged the BSA with discriminating against members be-
cause of their sexual orientation.36
The purpose of the Boy Scouts is found in its mission statement: "It is
the mission of the Boy Scouts of America to serve others by helping to
instill values in young people and, in other ways, to prepare them to
make ethical choices over their lifetime in achieving their full poten-
tial. 37 The values espoused by the BSA are also apparent in its Boy
32. See id.
33. See Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 787 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (N.D. I11. 1992). Boy
Scout activities often use goods sold by the BSA, including uniforms, the Cub Scout Fun
Book, and other books, and the items are sold throughout the United Sates at local coun-
cil service centers and Boy Scout-authorized outlets. See id. at 1518, 1520. In the year
ending 1989, the BSA took in $13 million from supply operations. See id. at 1521.
34. See id. at 1518.
35. See Dale If, 734 A.2d at 1205 n.4.
36. See id.; see also Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 276-77 (N.J. Super.
App. Div. 1998) (Dale I) (noting relevant portions of the January 1993 position state-
ment). The statement indicated that:
"The Boy Scouts of America does not ask prospective members about their sex-
ual preference, nor do we check on the sexual orientation of boys who are al-
ready Scouts.
The reality is that Scouting serves children who have no knowledge of, or interest
in, sexual preference. We allow youth to live as children and enjoy Scouting and
its diversity without immersing them in the politics of the day.
Membership in Scouting is open to all youth who meet basic requirements for
membership and who agree to live by the applicable oath and law.
The Boy Scouts of America has always reflected the expectations that Scouting
families have had for the organization.
We do not believe that homosexuals provide a role model consistent with these
expectations.
Accordingly, we do not allow for the registration of avowed homosexuals as
members or as leaders of the BSA."
Id. (quoting the BSA Mission Statement).
37. Dale H, 734 A.2d at 1202 (quoting the BSA's mission statement).
2000]
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Scout Oath and Scout Law." The Boy Scouts asserted in their briefs to
the New Jersey Supreme Court that the language "morally straight" and
"clean" in the Boy Scout Oath and Scout Law, respectively, exemplify
the BSA's rejection of homosexuality. 9 The BSA does not espouse any
particular religion or set of moral beliefs, and the scoutmasters' training
manual states that religious instruction is the responsibility of the home
and church.4° Further, the BSA encourages its scoutmasters to refrain
from discussing sexual topics.
41
B. Case Law Interpreting Public Accommodation Statutes
1. Interpreting the Law, Not Expanding It: The Story of Mark Welsh
In 1989, seven-year-old Mark Welsh received a flyer at school inviting
first-grade boys to attend a recruitment meeting for The Tiger Cubs, a
division of the BSA, held at a nearby school.42  Mark and his father,
Elliott Welsh, learned that the application to become a Tiger Cub in-
cluded a provision that required the applicant to "'recognize an obliga-
38. See id. (setting forth the Boy Scout Oath and the Boy Scout Law). The Boy Scout
Oath reads: "On my honor I will do my best To do my duty to God and my country and to
obey the Scout Law; To help other people at all times; To keep myself physically strong,
mentally awake, and morally straight." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Excerpts from
the Boy Scout Law provide:
"A Scout is FRIENDLY. A Scout is a friend to all. He is a brother to other
Scouts. He seeks to understand others. He respects those with ideas and cus-
toms that are different from his own.
A Scout is CLEAN. A Scout keeps his body and mind fit and clean. He goes
around with those who believe in living by these same ideals. He helps keep his
home and community clean."
Id. (emphasis in original).
39. See id. at 1202-03.
40. See id. at 1203.
41. See id. (quoting the Boy Scout Handbook). The Boy Scout Handbook contains a
subchapter called "Sexual Responsibility," which states that "[fjor the followers of most
religions, sex should take place only between married couples," and the BSA "believes
that boys should learn about sex and family life from their parents, consistent with their
spiritual beliefs." Id. (internal references and quotations omitted).
42. See Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 742 F. Supp. 1413,1417, 1438, App. A (N.D. Ill.
1990) (Welsh I) (describing the Tiger Cubs as a division of the Boy Scouts of America for
boys who are seven years old, or in the first grade, and their adult partner). An adult
partner participates with the Tiger Cub in virtually all group activities. See id. An adult
partner may be a parent, an aunt or uncle, a grandparent, an older sibling, or a neighbor
who is 18 years of age or older. See id. Appendix A of the court's decision in Welsh I also
notes that adult partners must host one or two group activities over the course of the year,
but that the activity "may not necessarily be held in the home; it may be at a park, fire sta-
tion, airport, ball game, etc." Id.
[Vol. 49:823
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tion to God' and to take an oath to do one's 'duty to God.', 43 Although
both Mark and Elliott were atheists, Elliott returned the application and
fees with a notation that he could not adhere to the BSA's Declaration of
Religious Principle (the Declaration).44 A BSA official later returned this
application to him with a letter indicating that the BSA could not accept
applications unless the applicant agreed to the Declaration.4 ' After in-
quiring with the BSA headquarters, Elliott received a reply that affirmed
the necessity of agreeing to the Declaration in order to become a Tiger
Cub.46
Elliott and Mark then brought suit against the Boy Scouts on March
21, 1990, alleging that their exclusion from the BSA violated Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4' The plaintiffs sought an injunction pre-
43. Id. at 1417-18. This provision is taken from the BSA's Declaration of Religious
Principles. See id.
44. See id. at 1418.
45. See id.
46. See id. The letter from Harold Sokolsky, Assistant to the Chief Scout Executive,
stated:
Our membership requirements which were established at our inception in 1910
have been in effect since then, and we are determined to maintain our position.
Adult leaders are required to sign our declaration of religious principle, and
youth members must subscribe to the Cub Scout Promise or Boy Scout Oath
which includes "duty to God."
While not intending to define what constitutes belief in God, we do reaffirm our
religious principle. You have a valid point that we do not explain this qualifica-
tion in our recruiting material and we are now studying ways to inform potential
members of this fact.
Id. at 1418 n.7.
47. See id. at 1418; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)-(b). The statute mandates that:
(a) Equal access
All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place
of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination
or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.
(b) Establishments affecting interstate commerce or supported in their activities
by State action as places of public accommodation; lodgings; facilities principally
engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises; gasoline stations; places
of exhibition or entertainment; other covered establishments
Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of
public accommodation within the meaning of this subchapter if its opera-
tions affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported
by State action:
(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging
to transient guests, other than an establishment located within a build-
ing which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which
is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his resi-
dence;
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain,
2000]
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venting the BSA from prohibiting persons who do not believe in God
from joining, and they sought admission of Mark as a Tiger Cub with
Elliott as his adult partner.48 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois refused to grant both the BSA's motion to
dismiss 49 and the plaintiff's ensuing motion for summary judgment."' The
same court later held that the Boy Scouts is not a place of public accom-
modation within the meaning of Title II and entered judgment in favor of
the BSA.5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision, and held that the BSA was not a
public accommodation under Title II, and even if it were, the private club
exception to Title II would apply to the BSA.52
As part of its analysis, the district court examined the legislative his-
tory of Title II.53 The court concluded that Congress intended the word
"place" to have its ordinary meaning. 4 The court stated that the legisla-
tive history of the Act "has been described as 'inconclusive' and 'ob-
scure,' 55 and made several points to illustrate its conclusion.
First, the original Senate bill banned discrimination with respect to
membership in labor unions and professional, business, or trade associa-
tions and organizations; however, the House bill, which was the version
or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on
the premises, including, but not limited to, any such facility located on
the premises of any retail establishment; or any gasoline station;
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, sta-
dium or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and
(4) any establishment (A)(i) which is physically located within the
premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or
(ii) within the premises of which is physically located any such covered
establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such
covered establishment.
Id.
48. See Welsh 1, 742 F. Supp. at 1418.
49. See id. at 1413.
50. See Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., No. 90 C 1671, 1991 WL 78179 (N.D. I11. May 6,
1991) (Welsh II).
51. See Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 787 F. Supp. 1511, 1512 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (Welsh
11I).
52. See Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1278 (7th Cir. 1993) (Welsh IV).
53. See Welsh 11, 787 F. Supp. at 1534-37 (cautioning that the words of a statute
themselves reflect congressional intent and "that presumption is rebutted only in the rare
circumstance in which the legislative history clearly reflects a purpose contrary to the or-
dinary meaning of the words used").
54. See id. at 1534.
55. Id. (citing Miller v. Amusement Enters., Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 349 (5th Cir. 1968)
(en banc), but stating that the history provided "clues" that Congress did not intend
"places" to include membership organizations that lacked a tangible place or facility).
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enacted, lacked such a ban.56 Second, senators who spoke in favor of the
bill emphasized its limited scope when testifying.57 For example, Senator
Humphrey testified that Congress drafted the bill to reach only the most
egregious discrimination, not that arising from personal or private rela-
tionships." Third, members of Congress only referred to the enumerated
establishments in the bill.59 They did not insinuate that other establish-
ments or organizations might fall within the scope of Title I1.60 Fourth,
lawmakers discussed the fundamental right to travel between states and
the importance of fostering interstate commerce in conjunction with the
Act.6' Finally, those who opposed the bill argued that it constituted a• • 62
violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution because they per-
63ceived it as intruding upon the property rights of business owners.
Based on the examination of the testimony before Congress, the dis-
trict court concluded that it should not construe Title II broadly,6 despite
the fact that previous cases held that the judiciary should liberally con-
strue Title II because of its remedial aim.65 The plaintiffs claimed that
the BSA was a "place of entertainment," and was covered, therefore, by
Title II.6 The district court, however, understood the precedent to mean
that it should interpret "place of entertainment" according to its gener-
ally accepted meaning.67 The court recognized that an establishment
might be a place of entertainment even though it was not specifically
mentioned in Title 11.68 Nevertheless, the court stated that to extend the
56. See id. at 1534.
57. See id. at 1534-35.
58. See id. Senator Humphrey testified, "This is a bill of limitation and restraint ....
Title II, like the bill as a whole, is designed to reach the most significant manifestations of
discrimination. It is carefully drafted and moderate in nature. There is no desire to regu-
late truly personal or private relationships." Id.
59. See id. at 1535.
60. See id. Representative Senner remarked that "Title II is moderate legislation. It
invades no man's privacy and compels no personal or confidential relationships. It deals
only with places which have traditionally held out services and facilities to the general
public." Id.
61. See id. at 1535-36.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
63. See Welsh 11, 787 F. Supp. at 1536; HOUSE OF REP. MINORITY REPORT UPON
PROPOSED CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1963, COMM. ON JUDICIARY SUBSTITUTE FOR H.R.
7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2431, 2441.
64. See Welsh III, 787 F. Supp. at 1537.
65. See id. (citing Miller v. Amusement Enters., Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 349 (5th Cir.
1968)).
66. Id. at 1537-38.
67. See id.
68. See id. (citing Miller, 394 F.2d at 350). The court quoted Miller's holding:
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definition of place to include organizations without a physical situs would
contravene the plain meaning and common understanding of "place of
entertainment. ,69 Because the issue at bar was not access to a physical
place, but access to an organization, the court concluded that the Boy
Scouts was not a "place of public accommodation" under Title II.7° The
Seventh Circuit affirmed this ruling, emphasizing the importance of con-
sidering the plain meaning of the statute and the role of the courts to in-
terpret statutes, not expand them.7
2. California Allows the BSA to Discriminate
California also interpreted its public accommodation statute as applied
to the Boy Scouts in Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts
of America.72 Although the facts of Curran are very similar to those of
Dale, the California Supreme Court found that the Boy Scouts did not
fall under the California Act.73
The plaintiff, Timothy Curran, was a highly decorated youth Scout.
7 4
As an adult, however, he was denied membership as an active member
because, just before he applied, a newspaper series chronicled Curran's
experience as a gay teenager in the San Francisco Bay Area.75 After un-
successfully appealing to the BSA, Curran filed an action against the
Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, alleging that the BSA's denial
"Although we recognize that ejusdem generis is an old and accepted rule of statu-
tory construction, we do not believe that it compels us to accord words and
phrases embodied in the statute a definition or interpretation different from their
common and ordinary meaning; or that the rule requires us to interpret the stat-
ute in such a narrow fashion as to defeat what we conceive to be its obvious and
dominating general purpose."
Id.
69. See id. at 1538-39.
70. See id. at 1541. A membership organization that neither operates out of nor fur-
nishes access to a fixed location is not a public accommodation under Title II. See id.
Therefore, the BSA and the Boy Scout Council are neither a "place of entertainment" nor
a "place of accommodation" under Title II because they lack the requisite connection to a
fixed location. See id.
71. See Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1278 (7th Cir. 1993) (Welsh IV).
The Court of Appeals further held that, even if the BSA was a public accommodation, it
would fall under the private club exemption to Title II. See id. The Court conducted an
analysis of the Landsdowne Swim Club factors, and found that the BSA is selective be-
cause it requires boys to conform to the values espoused by its Oath. See id. at 1276-77;
see also supra note 25 (outlining the Landsdowne Swim Club factors).
72. 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998) (Curran II).
73. See id. at 220.
74. See id. (stating that Curran received numerous scouting honors, among them at-
taining the rank of Eagle Scout and being selected to participate in a troop leadership de-
velopment program run by the BSA).
75. See id. at 221-22. The article did not mention the BSA. See id.
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of his application violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act.76
The Supreme Court of California disagreed with the lower court's con-
clusion that the BSA was a business establishment under the Unruh
Act. 7 The California legislature enacted the Unruh Civil Rights Act in
response to several court decisions that found that the 1897 statute did
not apply to denial of accommodations in certain businesses. Thus, the
court first considered the history of the Act, highlighting the 1897 public
accommodation statute that granted the right to "'full and equal accom-
modations, advantages, facilities and privileges' [in a number of specifi-
cally designated enterprises, as well as in] 'all other places of public ac-
commodation or amusement.' '79 Next, the Curran court compared three
previous cases involving the identification of business establishments to
articulate the criteria for evaluating whether an organization is a business
establishment. 8°
76. See id. at 222; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982 & Supp. 2000). The Act
reads in part: "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no
matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or disability are enti-
tled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in
all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." Id.
77. See Curran H, 952 P.2d 218; see also Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy
Scouts, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 337 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (Curran I) (including the BSA under
the scope of the Unruh Act because of its public nature). The court found that the Unruh
Act targets the discrimination that the BSA conducted. See id. It stated that the BSA was
included in the class of organizations that the California Legislature intended to include in
the Unruh Act: "all commercial and noncommercial entities open to and serving the gen-
eral public." Id. at 338. In addition, the court of appeals stated that precedent from the
Supreme Court of California supported the conclusion that California's Unruh Act "pro-
hibits arbitrary discrimination against homosexuals." Id. at 338-39. The court then deter-
mined that the BSA's charter did not authorize discrimination against homosexuals by the
organization, and that there was, therefore, no violation of the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, article VI, clause 2, and also no conflict between the Unruh
Act and the BSA's charter. See id. at 339.
78. See Curran H, 952 P.2d at 229. The original form of the statute mandated that:
"All citizens within the jurisdiction of this State, no matter what their race, color,
religion, ancestry, or national origin, are entitled to the full and equal admittance,
accommodations, advantages, facilities, membership, and privileges in, or ac-
corded by, all public or private groups, organizations, associations, business es-
tablishments, school and public facilities; to purchase real property; and to obtain
the services of any professional person, group, or association."
Id. (emphasis added by the court). The Unruh Act, CAL. CIVIL CODE § 51, enacted in
1959, granted entitlement to "full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privi-
leges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." (emphasis
added). See also supra note 76 (providing the full text of the act).
79. Curran II, 952 P.2d at 229 (citing Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club,
896 P.2d 776, 783-84 (Cal. 1995)).
80. See id. at 230 (considering Ibister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 707 P.2d 212
(Cal. 1985); O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n., 662 P.2d 427 (Cal. 1983); and
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In deciding that the BSA was not a business establishment, the court
rested on a few guiding principles." First, it quoted a prior decision
maintaining that, traditionally, courts have not applied public accommo-
dation statutes to private organizations' membership policies. Second,
the court inferred that the California legislature's failure to enact the
more expansive version of the Unruh Act meant that it intended to pre-
clude private organizations from coverage by the Act.83 Finally, although
in past decisions the court emphasized that it must interpret the language
in the Act as broadly as reasonably possible, 4 none of those cases in-
volved the membership decisions of an organization like the Boy Scouts,
which the court described as a charitable, expressive, and social organiza-
tion, with purposes unrelated to advancing its members' economic or
business interest." With these considerations in mind, the Supreme
Court of California held that the Boy Scouts were not a business estab-
lishment and therefore not subject to California's public accommodation
statute.86
3. In Kansas, Lack of "Business Purpose" Allows the BSA to
Discriminate
Kansas dealt with its public accommodation statute in regards to the
BSA in Seabourn v. Coronado Area Council, Boy Scouts of America.87
The Supreme Court of Kansas found that the BSA was not a public ac-
commodation under the Kansas Act Against Discrimination.8, The BSA
Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 370 P.2d 313 (Cal. 1962)). bister reviewed the origin and
legislative history of the Unruh Civil Rights Act and determined that the legislature in-
tended the Act to "cover at least all of the places of public accommodation or amusement
that had been subject to the California public accommodation statute that preceded the
[Unruh] Act." Curran 1H, 952 P.2d at 232 (considering bister's treatment of the Unruh
Act). Notably, while Ibister found the Boys Club to be a place of public amusement be-
cause it was a recreational facility where the public could drop-in and participate in activi-
ties, the Ibister court distinguished the Boy Scouts as an organization that does not have
such a primary function. See id.
81. See id. at 233-36.
82. See id. at 233 (citing Warfield, 896 P.2d at 789).
83. See id.
84. See Curran H, 952 P.2d at 236 (citing Burks, 370 P.2d at 313).
85. See id. (holding that the BSA cannot reasonably constitute a "business establish-
ment" in light of its overall purpose and function).
86. See id. at 220. The court, however, did state that the Unruh Act is not the only
legislative measure aimed at curbing discrimination on the basis of race. See id. at 239. It
therefore felt that the trial court's fear that exempting the organization from status as a
business establishment would permit the BSA to discriminate in such areas as race, would
not come to fruition. See id.
87. 891 P.2d 385 (Kan. 1995).
88. See id. at 387; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1001 to -1019 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
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denied Bradford Seabourn's registration to be an associate leader be-
cause he refused to affirm a belief in God. 9 The court interpreted Kan-
sas' public accommodation statute by comparing several other cases in-
volving the Boy Scouts, and concluded that the BSA did not fit the
statute's definition of a public accommodation. 9° Giving great weight to
the statute's legislative intent, the court concluded that the organization
itself needed to have a business purpose, not merely conduct business ac-
tivity.9'
4. Connecticut Confers Public Accommodation Status on the BSA
Although the Kansas and California courts found that the BSA was
not a public accommodation, other state's courts determined that their
public accommodation statutes covered the BSA 2 The Supreme Court
of Connecticut proclaimed that the Boy Scout Council was subject to
public accommodation status despite the fact that it did not have a fixed
situs in Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America v. Commission on
Human Rights and Opportunities.3 Disagreeing with the trial court, the
The Kansas statute states, in pertinent part:
The practice or policy of discrimination against individuals in employment rela-
tions, in relation to free and public accommodations, in housing by reason of
race, religion, color, sex, disability, national origin or ancestry or in housing by
reason of familial status is a matter of concern to the state, since such discrimina-
tion threatens not only the rights and privileges of the inhabitants of the state of
Kansas but menaces the institutions and foundations of a free democratic state.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state of Kansas to eliminate and pre-
vent discrimination in all employment relations, to eliminate and prevent dis-
crimination, segregation, or separation in all places of public accommodations
covered by this act, and to eliminate and prevent discrimination, segregation or
separation in housing.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1001. The statute also defines public accommodation:
[A]ny person who caters or offers goods, services, facilities and accommodations
to the public. Public accommodations include, but are not limited to, any lodging
establishment or food services establishment . . . any bar, tavern, barbershop,
beauty parlor, theater, skating rink, bowling alley, billiard parlor, amusement
park, recreation park, swimming pool, lake, gymnasium, mortuary, or cemetery
which is open to the public; or any public transportation facility. Public accom-
modations do not include a religious or nonprofit fraternal or social association
or corporation.
Id. § 44-1002.
89. See Seabourn v. Coronado Area Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 891 P.2d 385, 387
(Kan. 1995).
90. See id. at 406.
91. See id. at 403, 406.
92. See Quinnipiac Council, BSA v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportuni-
ties, 528 A.2d 352, 357 (Conn. 1987); Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am. & Monmouth Council,
734 A.2d 1196, 1200 (N.J. 1999) (Dale II).
93. 528 A.2d 352 (1987).
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supreme court chose to read Connecticut's statute94 broadly, and elected
to consider the legislative history of the statute.95
The Supreme Court of Connecticut grounded its decision in the word-
ing of the statute, and noted that the legislature did not link its definition
of "place" with a site, but with an "establishment., 96 The court also em-
phasized that the legislature had repeatedly amended Connecticut's pub-
lic accommodation statute by expanding the categories of covered busi-
nesses and organizations and abandoning the "laundry list" of covered
establishments in 1953. Further, the court noted that the legislature in-
tended the statute to serve a remedial purpose, which is the compelling
94. See id. at 354 (quoting the statute in effect at the time of the decision, CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 53-35(a) (Rev. to 1977)). The statute stated, in relevant part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to full and equal
accommodations in every place of public accommodation, resort or amusement,
subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable
alike to all persons; and any denial of such accommodation by reason of race,
creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status, age or physical disabil-
ity, including, but not limited to, blindness or deafness or the applicant therefor
shall be a violation of the provisions of this section. Any discrimination, segrega-
tion or separation, on account of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex,
marital status or physical disability, including, but not limited to blindness or
deafness shall be a violation of this section. A place of public accommodation,
resort or amusement within the meaning of this section means any establishment,
which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public in-
cluding, but not limited to, public housing projects and all other forms of publicly
assisted housing ....
Id. Connecticut's statute that is currently in effect states, in relevant part:
"Place of public accommodation, resort or amusement" means any establishment
which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public, in-
cluding, but not limited to, any commercial property or building lot, on which it is
intended that a commercial building will be constructed or offered for sale or
rent; ....
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-63 (1999). Section 46a-64 states, in part:
It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: ... To deny any
person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any
place of public accommodation, resort or amusement because of race, creed,
color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status, age, lawful source of income,
mental retardation, mental disability or physical disability, including, but not
limited to, blindness or deafness of the applicant, subject only to the conditions
and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons; ....
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64.
95. See Quinnipiac, 528 A.2d at 356-58 (emphasizing case law that has held that if the
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court need not look beyond the face of
the statute). Despite this, the court found ambiguity in the Connecticut statute and found
it proper to turn to the legislative history, the circumstances surrounding its enactment,
and its intended purpose. See id.
96. See id. at 357.
97. See id.
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interest of eliminating discriminatory public accommodation practices.98
From these findings, the court concluded that the Connecticut statute
"now regulates the discriminatory conduct and not the discriminatory si-
tus of an enterprise which offers its services to the general public."99
II. DALE AS THE MOST RECENT INTERPRETATION OF AN
ORGANIZATION'S ABILITY TO DISCRIMINATE IN ITS MEMBERSHIP
SELECTION
A. The BSA Revokes James Dale's Membership When It Discovers His
Homosexual Orientation
James Dale joined the Boy Scouts of America in 1978 at age eight as a
Cub Scout."t° He was distinguished an "exemplary scout," earning nu-
merous badges and honors,'1 including thirty merit badges, seven
achievement awards, the "Arrow of Light Award,"' '° and achievement of
the rank of Eagle Scout, an honor bestowed upon only three percent of
all Boy Scouts.0 3 He held several troop leadership positions, including
Junior Assistant Scoutmaster, and he was active in the Order of the Ar-
row, which is an affiliated honor camping association. '°4 The BSA chose
Dale for Vigil, the highest possible honor in the Order of the Arrow.' 5
Likewise, the BSA chose Dale to be a delegate at the 1985 National Boy
Scout Jamboree, and he was selected to speak at Monmouth Council
functions more than once.'O After his eighteenth birthday, in March of
1988, Dale applied for adult membership, which the BSA granted.' 7 He
was then appointed the Assistant Scoutmaster of Troop 73 in Matawan,
New Jersey,'08 and held this position for approximately sixteen months., 9
Dale attended Rutgers University, and commenced his studies around
98. See id. at 358.
99. Id.
100. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 275 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998) (Dale I).
101. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1204 (N.J. 1999) (Dale II).
102. See News Planet Staff, NJ Scout Tests Gay Exclusion, PlanetOut News (last modi-
fied Dec. 9, 1997) <http://www.planetout.com/news/article-print.html?1997/12/09/1>.
103. See Dale II, 734 A.2d at 1204.





109. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1204 (N.J. 1999) (Dale II).
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the same time he applied for adult membership with the Boy Scouts." °
While attending college, Dale first acknowledged to himself, and his
friends and family, that he was gay."' Dale joined the Rutgers University
Lesbian/Gay Alliance and later became the organization's co-
president."2 In July 1990, Dale attended a seminar on the psychological
and health needs of lesbian and gay teenagers."3 There, a New Jersey
newspaper interviewed him and later published an article and photo-
graph of him, identifying him as the co-president of the Rutgers associa-
tion."4 Later that July, Dale received a letter from Monmouth Council
Executive James W. Kay revoking his BSA membership."5
The letter from Kay also granted Dale sixty days to request a review of
his membership termination from the Monmouth Council Regional Re-
view Committee."' Dale drafted a letter to Kay and requested the rea-
son for the decision to revoke his membership."7 Kay's reply stated:
"The grounds for this membership revocation are the standards for lead-
ership established by the Boy Scouts of America, which specifically for-
bid membership to homosexuals. '' 18 Kay later revealed in deposition tes-
timony that he had become aware that Dale was a homosexual through
the article published in the Star Ledger in Newark." 9
Dale petitioned for review of his membership with the Northeast Re-





114. See id. at 1204-05; Kinga Borondy, Seminar Addresses Needs of Homosexual
Teens, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), July 8, 1990, §2, at 11 (cited in Dale II).
115. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 275 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998) (Dale I) (explaining that membership is a prerequisite for service as an adult
leader). The letter read, in part:
"After careful review, we have decided that your registration with the Boy
Scouts of America should be revoked. We are therefore compelled to request
that you sever any relations that you may have with the Boy Scouts of America.
You should understand that BSA membership registration is a privilege and is
not automatically granted to everyone who applies. We reserve the right to ref-
use registration whenever there is a concern that an individual may not meet the
high standards of membership which the BSA seeks to provide for American
youth."
Id.
116. See Dale 11, 734 A.2d at 1205.
117. See id. The letter was sent on August 8, 1990. See id.
118. Dale 1, 706 A.2d at 275.
119. See id.; supra note 114 and accompanying text (citing the newspaper article).
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and permission to attend the review.20  While the Regional Review
Committee acknowledged Dale's request, it provided him with neither
the BSA standards for leadership, nor a review date.12' Dale sent a sec-
ond letter making his requests, and the Northeast Region Review Com-
mittee informed him in late November that it supported the decision of
Monmouth Council to terminate his membership. 2 Dale then had thirty
days to seek review with the National Council Review Committee.
23
Dale responded, through counsel, to the Chief Scout Executive of the
BSA and requested both a rehearing and the opportunity to attend the
review. The attorney for the BSA informed Dale that he would not be
allowed to attend the review because "[the BSA] does not admit avowed
homosexuals to membership in the organization so no useful purpose
would apparently be served by having Mr. Dale present at the regional
review meeting.' ' 25 The Regional Committee agreed to allow the Na-
tional Council to review Dale's membership status, but Dale elected to
sue the Boy Scouts of America and Monmouth Council, as he believed
that review "would be futile.'
126
B. The New Jersey Superior Court Agrees with Dale's Assertion that the
BSA is a Public Accommodation
James Dale filed a six-count complaint against the BSA and the Mon-
mouth Council on July 20, 1992 in New Jersey state court, alleging that
the BSA violated both the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
(LAD) 127 and common law when it revoked his membership based solely
120. See Dale 11, 734 A.2d at 1205 (stating that previous communications to Dale had






125. Id. (quoting BSA's counsel); see also Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270,
276 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (Dale I) (clarifying that, according to Kay, Dale was
not stripped of any of the awards he had earned, including the Eagle Scout Award, and
that the membership revocation was kept confidential).
126. Dale 11, 734 A.2d at 1205.
127. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999). The statute states that
[a]ll persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment, and to obtain all
the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any place of public
accommodation, publicly assisted housing accommodation, and other real prop-
erty without discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, ances-
try, age, marital status, affectional or sexual orientation, familial status, or sex,
subject only to conditions and limitations applicable alike to all persons. This
opportunity is recognized as and declared to be a civil right.
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on his sexual orientation.' 28 Dale sought declaratory and injunctive relief,
compensatory and punitive damages, costs, and attorney fees129 on the
ground that the BSA is a public accommodation.30
Dale moved for partial summary judgement in September 1993 and
sought an immediate reinstatement based on his assertion that the de-
fendants violated the LAD and New Jersey's public policy. 3' Defen-
Id.; see also Dale 1, 706 A.2d at 277-78 (explaining that the statute was amended in 1991 to
include the categories of "affectional or sexual orientation").
"Affectional or sexual orientation" means male or female heterosexuality, homo-
sexuality or bisexuality by inclination, practice, identity or expression, having a
history thereof or being perceived, presumed or identified by others as having
such an orientation.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(hh).
128. See Dale H, 734 A.2d at 1205. The court found that Dale's common law claims
were duplicative of his claims under the statue, and that his interests would be effectively
redressed under the LAD. See id. at 1219.
129. See id. at 1205.
130. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(l). The statute defines place of public accommoda-
tion to
[i]nclude, but not be limited to: any tavern, roadhouse, hotel, motel, trailer camp,
summer camp, day camp, or resort camp, whether for entertainment of transient
guests of accommodation of those seeking health, recreation or rest; any pro-
ducer, manufacturer, wholesaler, distributer, retail shop, store, establishment, or
concession dealing with goods or services of any kind; any restaurant, eating
house, or place where food is sold for consumption on the premises; any place
maintained for the sale of ice cream, ice and fruit preparations or their deriva-
tives, soda water or confections, or where any beverages of any kind are retailed
for consumption on the premises; any garage, any public conveyance operated on
land or water, or in the air, any stations and terminals thereof; any bathhouse,
boardwalk, or seashore accommodation; any auditorium, meeting place, or hall;
any theatre, motion-picture house, music hall, roof garden, skating rink, swim-
ming pool, amusement and recreation park, fair, bowling alley, gymnasium,
shooting gallery, billiard and pool parlor, or other place of amusement; any com-
fort station; any dispensary, clinic or hospital; any public library; any kindergar-
ten, primary and secondary school, trade or business school, high school, acad-
emy, college and university, or any educational institution under the supervision
of the State Board of Education, or the Commissioner of Education of the State
of New Jersey. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to include or to ap-
ply to any institution, bona fide club, or place of accommodation, which is in its
nature distinctly private; nor shall anything herein contained apply to any educa-
tional facility operated or maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institu-
tion, and the right of a natural parent or one in loco parentis to direct the educa-
tion and upbringing of a child under his control is hereby affirmed; nor shall
anything herein contained be construed to bar any private secondary or post sec-
ondary school from using in good faith criteria other than race, creed, color, na-
tional origin, ancestry or affectional or sexual orientation in the admission of stu-
dents.
Id.
131. See Dale II, 734 A.2d at 1205.
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dants cross-moved for summary judgment on all counts. '  The trial
judge in the Chancery Division granted summary judgment to defen-
dants on the grounds that the parties had stipulated that Dale was "a
sexually active homosexual," and that the BSA consistently had refused
membership to any self-declared gay individual because of its position
that homosexual conduct was "neither 'morally straight' under the Scout
Oath nor 'clean' under the Scout Law."'33 The judge in the Chancery Di-
vision relied on biblical and historical views that denounced homosexu-
134
ality, and he articulated that the BSA advocated the same viewpoint.
The trial judge found that the Boy Scouts was not a place of public ac-
commodation as defined by New Jersey's statute. 135 Consequently, Dale
had no cause of action because the BSA fell under the statutory exclu-
sion for a distinctively private institution.36 The judge further concluded
that the state could not force the BSA to accept Dale as an adult leader-
member because of the organization's First Amendment freedom of ex-
pressive association rights.1 37 He stated that the BSA's historical convic-
tion regarding the immorality of homosexual conduct was such that
"'[t]he presence of a publicly avowed active homosexual as an adult
leader of boy scouts is absolutely antithetical to the purpose of Scout-
ing.,,,138
The state appellate court reversed the trial court and held that the
BSA and its local councils were places of public accommodation because
they invite the public at large. 39 The superior court considered a number
of other rulings that grappled with whether the BSA was a public ac-
commodation . 4  It rejected the narrow interpretation that Welsh v. Boy
132. See id.
133. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 277 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998) (Dale I) (reporting on the decision of the Superior Court, Chancery Division in Dale
v. Boy Scouts of Am., No. MON-C-330-92 (Ch. Div. Nov. 3, 1995)); see also Dale I1, 734
A.2d at 1205-06 (citing Chancery Division decision).
134. See Dale 1, 706 A.2d at 277.
135. See id.
136. See id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(l) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999)).
137. See id.
138. Id. (quoting Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am, No. MON-C-330-92 (Ch. Div. Nov. 3,
1995)).
139. See Dale 1, 706 A.2d at 280, 283; see also National Org. for Women, Essex County
Chapter v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d 33, 37 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974)
(holding that a baseball field was a sufficient "place" to qualify Little League for a "place
of public accommodation" under the LAD, and therefore prohibit it from discriminating
against females who wished to join).
140. See Dale 1, 706 A.2d at 278-79 & n.2 (citing Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d
1267 (7th Cir. 1993) (Welsh IV), which held that the the BSA was not a public accommo-
dation under Title II). The Dale I court considered a number of divergent opinions, see,
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Scouts of America 14 gave to Title II on the basis that the New Jersey
statute is remedial and should therefore be given a broad interpretation
consistent with its objectives of eliminating discrimination.'42 The court
further underscored that the definition of "place" should not be the de-
terminative factor in delineating the scope of the antidiscrimination stat-
ute.143 To support its conclusion, the superior court quoted the dissenting
opinion in Welsh, which emphasized that people, not places, discrimi-
nate. 44
The court then considered New Jersey precedent on the interpretation
of the LAD.14 ' The court concluded that it should interpret the LAD
e.g., Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 238 (Cal.
1998) (Curran II) (BSA not a business establishment under Unruh Act); Yeaw v. Boy
Scouts of Am., 64 Cal. Rptr. 85, 91-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997), review granted & opinion su-
perseded by 942 P.2d 415 (Cal. 1997) (same); Randall v. Orange County Council, Boy
Scouts of Am., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53 (Cal. Ct. App.), review granted & opinion superseded by
874 P.2d 900 (Cal. 1994) (same); Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Commission
on Human Rights and Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352, 360 (Conn. 1987) (finding that the
BSA is a public accommodation under Connecticut statute); Seabourn v. Coronado Area
Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 891 P.2d 385, 391, 406 (Kan. 1995) (narrowly interpreting
Kansas' public accommodation to allow the BSA to deny membership application to a
professed atheist).
141. 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993).
142. See Dale 1, 706 A.2d at 279 (construing precedent as establishing that the New
Jersey LAD should be construed liberally to achieve its purpose as a remedial statute of
eliminating discrimination). Previous cases have asserted that the New Jersey Legislature
intended that the Act should be liberally construed, and therefore the narrow interpreta-
tion of Welsh IV, should not be duplicated. See id. In support of its position, the court
cited Fuchilla v. Layman, 537 A.2d 652 (N.J. Super. 1988), which asserted that the goal of
the LAD is "nothing less than the eradication 'of the cancer of discrimination,"' and An-
derson v. Exxon Co., 446 A.2d 486 (N.J. Super. 1982), which maintained that the social
significance of the LAD demands that it be read liberally. See Dale 1, 706 A.2d at 279.
143. Dale I, 706 A.2d at 279.
144. See id. (declaring the Welsh majority's reliance on the term "place" to be "irra-
tional"). Such an interpretation is itself discriminatory because it targets those who pos-
sess the financial resources to operate from a fixed place. See id. Further, there is no rea-
son to conclude that those who operate from a fixed place are more likely to discriminate
than organizations or businesses that do not. See id.
145. See id. at 279-282 (citing Fuchilla, 537 A.2d at 660-61, which emphasized the im-
portance of construing the LAD liberally; National Org. for Women v. Little League
Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d 33, 36 (N.J. App. Div. 1974), which also emphasized the remedial
status of the LAD and the importance of reading it with the statute's objectives in mind,
and finding the Little League to comport with a broad reading of the statute as a place of
public accommodation; Fraser v. Robin Dee Day Camp, 210 A.2d 208, 212 (N.J. 1965),
which emphasized that "facilities and activities 'offered to and ... dependent upon the
broad-based participation of members of the general public' are the types of accommoda-
tion the legislature intended to reach through the LAD."; Clover Hill Swimming Club v.
Goldsboro, 219 A.2d 161 (N.J. 1966), which held that a private swimming club was a public
accommodation because it advertised and extended a general invitation to the public to
join).
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broadly in concurrence with legislative intent. 46 It reiterated that New
Jersey rejected Welsh's narrow view because the term "place of public
accommodation" is a term of "convenience, not of limitation.'
47
In its decision, the superior court considered several characteristics of
the BSA.'48 First, the Boy Scouts solicited a broad base for its member-
ship.149 Second, the BSA extended an open invitation to boys to join the
organization, and more stringent criteria for adult leaders was not suffi-
cient to make the organization private.5 Third, the BSA had on-going
relationships with other places of public accommodation."' Finally, the
lack of a specific place where the BSA is situated does not exempt the
organization from the statute. "2
C. The Supreme Court of New Jersey Affirms
The Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the trial court's evalua-
tion.153 After a thorough discussion of the nature of the BSA, including
its goals and values,54 the court considered the objectives of the New Jer-
gey statute and its definition of the word "place."'55 The court noted that
terms of the LAD would bind the BSA if the court found it to be a place
of public accommodation not meeting any of the statute's exemptions.'56
The court then discussed public accommodations, and asked three
questions: (1) whether the BSA engages in broad public solicitation;
(2) whether it maintains close relationships with the government or other
public accommodations; and (3) whether the BSA is similar to enumer-
ated or other previously recognized public accommodations. 5 7 The court
146. See Dale 1, 706 A.2d at 279 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West 1993 & Supp.
1999), which states explicitly that the legislature intends the Act to be liberally construed
in combination with other protections available under New Jersey law).
147. Id. (quoting Little League, 318 A.2d at 37).
148. See id. at 280-83.
149. See id. at 280-81.
150. See id. at 282.
151. See id. at 282-83.
152. See id. at 283.
153. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1200 (N.J. 1999) (Dale II).
154. See supra Part L.A (discussing the background and structure of the BSA).
155. See Dale II, 734 A.2d at 1208-10 (stating that "[i]n New Jersey, 'place' has been
more than a fixed location since 1974.").
156. See id. at 1208 (referring to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5). These exceptions include,
but are not limited to, "'distinctly private entities,' religious educational facilities, and par-
ents or individuals acting 'in loco parentis' in respect of 'the education and upbringing of a
child."' Id.
157. See id. at 1210 (acknowledging that inviting the public to join an organization is a
primary characteristic of a public accommodation). An organization can extend this invi-
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answered the three questions in the affirmative, and found the organiza-
tion to be a place of public accommodation.
5 8
The court first considered the level of the BSA's public solicitation. 59
It found overwhelming evidence of an invitation to the public to join the
BSA in, among other media efforts, a $1 million national television ad-
vertising campaign in 1989, advertisements in periodicals such as Sports
Afield and Redbook, and promotional materials 6° that the BSA supplied
to local councils.' The greatest impetus for the court's decision was the
BSA's encouragement of scouts to wear their uniforms in public, which
the court stated was a "symbolic invitation."'62 According to the New
Jersey high court, this assertive conduct constituted intent to invite the
public at large 63 and, therefore, the LAD required that the public have
equal rights to membership.1
4
The court found further justification for its decision when it considered
the last two questions. 65 Organizations that benefit from relationships
with the government or other public accommodations are themselves
public accommodations.6 6  As a congressionally chartered organiza-
tation though advertising or other methods of attracting the public. See id. at 1210-11. In
fact, New Jersey has well-established and long-standing precedents on the issue of public
solicitation as a criteria for public accommodation. See id. at 1227 (observing that New
Jersey has long been a leader in the pursuit of protecting victims of invidious discrimina-
tion).
158. See id. at 1210-13.
159. See id. at 1211. New Jersey courts have persistently held that "when an entity in-
vites the public to join, attend, or participate in some way, that entity is a public accom-
modation within the meaning of the LAD." Id.
160. The court drew attention to promotional materials that ranged from television
and radio announcements to posters. See id. at 1210.
161. See id. The court also quoted a New York Times article that described one BSA
spokesperson as touting that: "'scouting [is] a product and we've got to get the product
into the hands of as many consumers as we can."' Id.
162. See id. at 1211. Wearing a Boy Scout uniform to school and participating in
"School Nights" and other demonstrations piques public curiosity. See id. The BSA ad-
mitted that it encourages the wearing of uniforms in public to arouse such curiosity with
the goal of attracting new members. See id.
163. See id..
164. See id. (quoting Evans v. Ross, 154 A.2d 441 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959),
which emphasized that once invited, the public should not suffer the humiliation and em-
barrassment of being excluded).
165. See Dale 1I, 734 A.2d at 1211-13.
166. See id. at 1211-12 (citing Frank v. Ivy Club, 576 A.2d 241 (N.J. 1990), which
grounded its decision of attributing public accommodation status to an all-male eating club
on the club's symbiotic relationship with Princeton University). Additionally, a court is
likely to hold that an entity that is similar to one listed in the New Jersey statute is a place
of public accommodation. See id. at 1213 (citing Board of Chosen Freeholders v. New Jer-
sey, 732 A.2d 1053, 1059 (N.J. 1999), which explained that "[u]nder the ejusdem generis
principle of statutory construction, when specific words follow more general words in a
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tion, 1 67 the BSA has maintained close relations with every President of
the United States,6 the military, and state governments."7  It also re-
cruits new members in schools and holds meetings and other functions at
school facilities."' Finally, the court cited the similarities of the BSA to
other entities listed in the statute.172 It found the BSA's educational and
recreational functions to be sufficiently similar to day camps and baseball
teams, which previous courts determined to be places of public accom-
modation under the LAD.173 Given this array of factors, the court de-
clared that the BSA was a public accommodation.
1 4
The Boy Scouts contended, however, that even if it was a place of
public accommodation, it was exempt from coverage by the statute under
statutory enumeration, we can consider what additional items might also be included by
asking whether those items are similar to those enumerated.").
167. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. Congress chartered the BSA in 1916.
See Ch. 148, § 1, 39 Stat. 227 (1916) (current version at 36 U.S.C. §§ 21-28 (1994)). An-
other federal law facilitates the receipt of equipment, supplies, and services by the BSA
from agencies of the federal government. See 10 U.S.C. § 2544(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
The Dale 11 court noted that the Secretary of Defense and other federal agencies are
authorized to
lend to the Boy Scouts of America, for the use and accommodation of Scouts,
Scouters, and officials who attend any national or world Boy Scout Jamboree,
such cots, blankets, commissary equipment, flags, refrigerators, and other equip-
ment and without reimbursement, furnish services and expendable medical sup-
plies, as may be necessary or useful to the extent that items are in stock and items
or services are available.
Dale If, 734 A.2d at 1212 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2544(a)).
168. See Dale 11, 734 A.2d at 1212 (illustrating the link by citing one of the BSA's
promotional materials, which boasts that every president since William Howard Taft has
served as Honorary President of the BSA).
169. See id. (quoting a BSA pamphlet to show that facilities are available to the BSA
for its events at many Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard installations).
170. See id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 23:2-3 (West 1997), which allows the New Jersey
Division of Fish, Game, and Wildlife in the Department of Environmental Protection to
stock any body of water in New Jersey with fish that the BSA controls and uses, and N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:3-27 (West 1990 & Supp. 2000), which exempts the BSA from motor ve-
hicle fees).
171. See id. at 1212-13.
172. See id. at 1213.
173. See id. In support of its conclusion, the court cited Fraser v. Robin Dee Day
Camp, 210 A.2d 208 (N.J. 1965). Fraser held that a day camp has much in common with
swimming pools, recreation and amusement parks, and primary schools, and therefore was
a public accommodation because of the similarity with the enumerated entities under the
statute. The Dale court also relied on National Organization for Women v. Little League
Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d 33, 36 (N.J. App. Div. 1974), which held that a little league team's
"educational and recreational nature" makes it similar to the places of public accommoda-
tion described by the LAD.
174. See Dale 1I, 734 A.2d at 1213.
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three exceptions.' These three exceptions were the "distinctly private"
exception, the religious educational facility exception, and the in loco pa-
rentis exception.'
76
The Supreme Court of New Jersey first considered the distinctly pri-
vate exception and stated that the exception is a narrowly drawn statu-
tory exclusion.' Because the Boy Scouts solicits a broad membership
base and has had over 87 million members since its inception, the court
determined that it is not a selective organization, despite professed
membership criteria. 17 Therefore, the BSA did not qualify for the dis-
175. See id.
176. See id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(l) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999). The stat-
ute's exemption states:
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to include or to apply to any institu-
tion, bona fide club, or place of accommodation, which is in its nature distinctly
private; nor shall anything herein contained apply to any educational facility op-
erated or maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institution, and the
right of a natural parent or one in loco parentis to direct the education and up-
bringing of a child under his control is hereby affirmed[.]
Id.
177. See Dale 11, 734 A.2d at 1214. The Dale II court relied on the New York Court of
Appeals' interpretation of New York's distinctly private exception in United States Power
Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Board, 452 N.E.2d 1199, 1204 (N.Y. 1983), which
stated that the exception "does not refer simply to private clubs or establishments closed
to the public but uses more restrictive language excluding from the statute's provisions
only clubs which are 'distinctly private."' Dale 11, 734 A.2d at 1214. Further, distinctly
private status is a question of fact which the organization has the burden of establishing.
See United States Power Squadrons, 452 N.E.2d at 1204. The New York Court of Appeals
laid out five criteria that the fact finder may consider: (1) whether the club has permanent,
subjective membership criteria; (2) whether the club limits the use of its facilities to only
its members and their bona fide guests; (3) whether the members control the club;
(4) whether the club is "nonprofit and is operated solely for the benefit and pleasure of the
members"; and (5) whether the club's publicity is only extended to its members. Id.
178. See Dale H, 734 A.2d at 1214-17. In 1992 alone, the Boy Scouts had over four
million boys and one million adults in its membership. See id. In addition, the BSA publi-
cations indicated that one of its goals was to build its membership base. See id. The Dale
1I court considered a booklet, entitled A Representative Membership, which espouses the
organization's national objective of extending the opportunity to all eligible youth to join
the Boy Scouts. See id. The booklet stated:
We have high hopes for our nation's future. These hopes cannot flower if any
part of our citizenry feels deprived of the opportunity to help shape our future.
How can you persuade other Scouters to accept a commitment to a representa-
tive membership? Consider these facts:
1. Our federal charter sets forth our obligation to serve boys. Neither the charter
nor the bylaws of the Boy Scouts of America permits the exclusion of any boy.
The National Council and Executive Board have always taken the position that
Scouting should be available for all boys who meet the entrance age require-
ments.
4. Another aim of Scouting is the development of leadership. Leadership in
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tinctly private exception."9 Neither was the court receptive to the BSA's
claims that it was an educational facility operated by a religious or sec-
tarian institution, nor that it acted in loco parentis.'8 Therefore, the ex-
ceptions did not apply and the BSA did not escape the statute's prohibi-
tion of discrimination.""
Judge Handler concurred, but wrote separately to emphasize the im-
portance of "genuine [membership] selectivity" as a paramount factor in
the determination of whether an organization is a place of public ac-
commodation.' He further explored the case's implications for the in-
America is needed in all sections of the country and in all economic, cultural, and
ethnic groups.
5. To meet these responsibilities we have made a commitment that our member-
ship shall be representative of all the population in every community, district,
and council.
Id. at 1215 (citing BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, A REPRESENTATIVE MEMBERSHIP 2
(1975)) (emphasis added by the court).
179. See id. at 1215-16 (noting that the size of the BSA implies an open membership
policy). Further, the requirement that members comply with the Boy Scout Oath and the
Boy Scout Law did not constitute genuine selectivity criteria, despite the BSA's reliance
on Welsh IV. See id.; see also supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the Welsh decision). The court
observed that the joining requirements must act to truly limit individuals from joining an
organization, and that the BSA had used the Oath and Law to exclude prospective mem-
bers infrequently. See Dale H, 734 A.2d at 1216. Therefore, the BSA placed practically no
limitation on joining the organization. See id. Finally, the court echoed the appellate divi-
sion's finding that more stringent criteria for adult members does not make the BSA as a
whole a public accommodation. See id. at 1217. The lower court ruled that basing the
status of a public accommodation on an organization because of its adult membership cri-
teria was "clearly inconsistent with the remedial purposes of the LAD." Id. (citing Dale v.
Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270,282 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (Dale 1)).
180. See Dale 1I, 734 A.2d at 1217-18 (dismissing the BSA's assertion that it was "a
educational facility operated or maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institu-
tion" because the BSA stated that the organization was nonsectarian in its bylaws and its
Scout Handbook). Further, the BSA does not act in loco parentis because it undertakes
no responsibility to rear or maintain its members who are minors. See id. (citing In re
M.S., 374 A.2d 445, 447 (N.J. 1977), which defines in loco parentis as "one who means to
put himself in the situation of the lawful father with reference to the father's office and
duty of making provision for the child.").
181. See id. at 1230 (holding that the BSA is a place of public accommodation and falls
under the LAD). The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the judgment of the Ap-
pellate Division and remanded the suit to the Chancery Division for proceedings consis-
tent with its opinion. See id.
182. See id. at 1230-45 (Handler, J., concurring) (recognizing that "the 'distinctly pri-
vate' exception is the 'other side of the public accommodation coin,"' and citing Kiwanis
Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468, 476 (3d Cir. 1986)). The direct relation-
ship emphasized by Judge Handler signified that a court must find that an organization is
distinctly private in order for it to escape classification as a public accommodation. See id.
at 1231. Further, Judge Handler opined that selectivity is the preeminent factor in such a
determination. See id. Judge Handler elaborated, however, that membership selectivity is
not the determinative factor of an organization's public accommodation status. See id. at
1234. Genuine membership selectivity may prove that an otherwise public organization is
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terdependence of expression and identity for lesbians and gay men
through self-identifying speech.'83 Judge Handler concluded that the
New Jersey Legislature recognized the consequence of the link between
identity and expression for homosexuals when it included protection
against discrimination on the basis of affectional or sexual orientation.'1
From this conclusion, Judge Handler extrapolated that the BSA ex-
cluded Dale because of his sexual orientation, meaning his status, not be-
cause he expressed his views.185
Judge Handler then determined that the BSA had not established a
sufficiently robust point of view regarding homosexuality, and therefore,
the First Amendment's protection of freedom of expression did not
reach the organization in its membership selection.1 6 Finally, the concur-
ring opinion issued a strong repudiation of the reliance on stereotypes
and assumptions as the basis for discrimination based on affectional or
distinctly private, but a lack of genuine selectivity always suffices to classify an organiza-
tion as public. See id.
183. See id. at 1235-39. Justice Handler made clear that a club may make member se-
lection criteria dependent upon an individual's viewpoints through the constitutional pro-
tection of the club's freedom of expression. See id. at 1235-36. Nevertheless, a club may
not discriminate in its membership selection based on an individual's status, whether that
status be sex, race, or sexual orientation. See id. If an organization has a "specific expres-
sive purpose" that is "clear, particular, and consistent," then the organization may refuse
to admit individuals according to their purpose, because then the admission of such indi-
viduals would alter the organization's speech. Id. at 1236-37. Judge Handler cited Ku
Klux Klan v. Town of Thurmont, 700 F. Supp. 281, 289 (D. Md. 1988), which stated that
the core purpose of the Klan is to advance a certain message. See Dale II, 734 A.2d at
1236-37 (Handler J., concurring). Judge Handler explained that the Maryland court thus
upheld the exclusion of African-American participants in a Klan march because allowing
them to march would prohibit the Klan from advancing its primary message. See id.
The concurrence defined self-identifying speech as "[t]he confluence of status and ex-
pression when both relate to the speaker's sexual orientation." Id. at 1238. It is a major
factor in conveying identity. See id. Some scholars have deemed self-identifying speech
critical in construing identity for lesbians and gay men. See Nan D. Hunter, Identity,
Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REv. 1695, 1718 (1993); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist
Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell," 108 YALE L.J. 485, 550 (1998).
184. See Dale 11, 734 A.2d at 1239 (Handler, J., concurring); see also N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:5-5(hh) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999) (defining affectional or sexual orientation); supra
note 127 (quoting the definition).
185. See Dale 11, 734 A.2d at 1239 (Handler, J., concurring).
186. See id. at 1241 (finding that the BSA had "not established a clear, particular, and
consistent message concerning homosexuality" and therefore the status-based discrimina-
tion of the BSA was not protectable under the First Amendment); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.").
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187
sexual orientation. Judge Handler contended that using stereotypes
does not define societal mores and viewpoints. Consequently, admit-
ting a homosexual leader would not disturb the BSA's goals of adhering
to traditional moral values and encouraging those values in its members
because the stereotypes are not representative of social values.189
On January 14, 2000, the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear
the BSA's appeal.1' The Court held oral arguments on April 26, 2000 on
the issue of whether requiring the BSA to admit an openly gay leader
violates the organization's rights of free association and free speech un-
der the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.9
III. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION STATUTES FRUSTRATE THEIR PURPOSE
OF ERADICATING DISCRIMINATION
The field of public accommodation law seems both unsettled and con-
fused, given that the same organization can be included under one state's
statute and be exempted under another's."9 Problems exist with the fed-
eral statute, and some commentators suggest that plaintiffs should assert
187. See Dale H, 734 A.2d at 1242 (Handler, J., concurring) (emphatically rejecting the
use of stereotypes as a justification for discrimination against homosexuals). There exists
no scientific evidence that supports the stereotype that homosexuals are inherently im-
moral; further, ample evidence exists to prove the contrary. See id. (citing Gregory M.
Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's Guide to Social Science Research,
1 LAW & SEXUALITY 133, 134 (1991)).
188. See id. at 1245 (Handler, J., concurring) (arguing that stereotypes are a vehicle for
discrimination against individuals).
189. See id. Judge Handler found stereotypes and other baseless assumptions regard-
ing the immorality of homosexuals to be contrary to current law and public policy, and
therefore an inaccurate representation of present-day social values. See id. Therefore,
admitting members who are homosexuals will not prevent the BSA from promoting moral
values among its membership. See id.
190. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), cert. granted,
68 U.S.L.W. 3447, 3449, 3450 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2000) (No. 99-699).
191. See Joan Biskupic, Court Takes Cases on Abortion, Gays, WASH. POST, Jan. 15,
2000, at Al; see also Kathy Barrett Carter, Scouting Case Goes to Justices, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark) (Jan. 15, 2000) <http://www.nj.com/page1/ledger/e34fdl.html>. The question
presented to the court in the appeal by the BSA and Monmouth Council was: "Whether a
state law requiring a Boy Scout troop to appoint an avowed homosexual and gay rights
activist as an assistant scoutmaster responsible for the communicating of Boy Scouting's
moral values to youth members abridges First Amendment rights of freedom of speech
and freedom of association." Interview with Charles Schmitz, supra note 12. Oral argu-
ment was held on April 26, 2000 and a decision is expected in late June 2000. See Bisku-
pic, supra note 12.
192. Compare Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d
218, 220 (Cal. 1998) (Curran II) (finding the BSA to be exempt from California's Unruh
Act), with Dale 11, 734 A.2d at 1200, 1228 (N.J. 1999) (requiring that the BSA conform to
the requirements of New Jersey's LAD).
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claims under their state statute since Title II is limited in its coverage.1 93
This is, in large part, because Congress has been reluctant to expand the
scope of the federal public accommodation statute beyond racial dis-
crimination.
194
A. A Wellspring of Inconsistency: The Obstacle of Ambiguous Statutory
Drafting
In reaction to the minimal protection provided by the federal statute,
state legislatures expanded their public accommodation statutes.'9
States formulated provisions to guard against discrimination on the basis
of race, national origin, religion, sex, disability, sexual orientation, mari-
tal status, sexual preference, pregnancy, parenthood, political affiliation,
and personal appearance."'
State statutes, however, lack uniformity.'97 This dissimilarity especially
193. See Paul Varela, Note, A Scout is Friendly: Freedom of Association and the State
Effort to End Private Discrimination, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 919, 932 (1989) (contend-
ing that state, rather than federal, statutes have been the most effective avenue to fight
discrimination); see also Pamela Griffin, Comment, Exclusion and Access in Public Ac-
commodations: First Amendment Limitations Upon State Law, 16 PAC. L.J. 1047, 1052
(1985) (illustrating that the scope of state public accommodations laws is generally greater
than that of federal law in regards to the range of covered establishments, and further, the
class of covered individuals is greater in state laws); cf Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 7,
at 287-89 (advocating the amendment of Title II because of the narrowness of the federal
law and the demonstration of the potential for expansion exemplified by innovative state
statutes).
194. See Varela, supra note 193, at 933 (explaining that in addition to being limited to
racial discrimination, Title II is generally limited to "traditional places of public accom-
modation, such as restaurants and hotels").
195. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64 (1999); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501 (1999);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-2 (1994 & Supp. 1998). These statutes have greater protection
than Title II, including provisions to prevent discrimination based on sex, handicap, age,
sexual preference, and personal appearance. However, even these three expansive stat-
utes do not cover all of the listed classifications; thus, these three jurisdictions exemplify
the disparity in statutory coverage nationwide.
196. See Singer, supra note 13, at 1491, app. II (listing state laws and their coverage);
see also Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 7, at 260 (detailing the disparate coverage of
state statutes).
197. See Varela, supra note 193, at 933 nn.91-97 (citing statutes that protect a variety
of classifications). One group of statutes guards against sex discrimination. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64 (1999); IDAHO CODE § 18-7301 (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-
24-2 (1994 & Supp. 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-501 (1998). Another group prohibits
discrimination on the basis of handicap. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64 (1999);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-2; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-23
(Michie 1995). Marital status is another protected class in some statues. See, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 46a-64 (1999); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2)(a)
(McKinney 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-715 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 11999). Other statues
encompass classifications based on age. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64 (1999); D.C.
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presents a problem for organizations and businesses that act in several
states, and the patrons of such organizations. Hence, these parties can
expect little consistency in their protection from one state to another be-
cause the definition of what constitutes a place of public accommodation
remains dissimilar and unsettled.
9 8
A state is free to construct its own definition of a place of public ac-
commodation because there is no constitutional guidance on the sub-
ject.199 Indeed, as one commentator notes, "[an organization may be
'public' for the purposes of the [public accommodation statute] of one
state and 'private' for the purposes of the [statute] in another state. ' '2°°
The disparate treatment of an organization is attributable both to varia-
CODE ANN. § 1-2501; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-2; TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-501. Certain
statutes contain a note regarding sexual preference. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501.
Infrequently, states prohibit discrimination based on personal appearance, see D.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-2501, and class discrimination, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98
(West 1990).
198. See Varela, supra note 193, at 934 (explaining that the United States Supreme
Court has placed limitations on the definition of a place of public accommodation based
upon statutory construction, rather than constitutional interpretation). Mr. Varela sug-
gests that the "problem lies in identifying the groups that may legitimately seek protection
under the umbrella of freedom of association." Id. at 937.
199. See id. at 934; see also Koppen, supra note 15, at 643, 647-48 & nn.35 & 37. The
limits of the Commerce Clause do not bind the states' internal regulations; therefore, they
may be more restrictive in their prohibitions of discrimination. See id. at 648. In addition,
the states have paternal interests in protecting their residents, which leads to the inclusion
of protection for additional classes. See id. In order to fall under the provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, an establishment's acts must "affect commerce." See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a(c) (1994); Koppen, supra note 15, at 648 n.41. New Jersey's LAD was enacted
according to the state's police power. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-2 (West 1993 & Supp.
1999). The LAD states: "The enactment hereof shall be deemed an exercise of the police
power of the State for the protection of the public safety, health and morals and to pro-
mote the general welfare and in fulfillment of the provisions of the Constitution of this
State guaranteeing civil rights." Id.
200. Varela, supra note 193, at 934. Compare Schwenk v. Boy Scouts of Am., 551 P.2d
465, 469, 469 n.5 (Or. 1976) (holding that the BSA is a private organization under Ore-
gon's public accommodation statute, and is therefore not required to admit a female as a
cub scout), with Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218,
220 (Cal. 1998) (Curran II) (finding that the BSA is not a "business establishment[]" un-
der California's public accommodation statute, and is therefore not required to admit a
homosexual as an adult leader), and Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc. v.
Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352, 355 (Conn. 1987) (hold-
ing that the BSA is a place of public accommodation under Connecticut's public accom-
modation statute; however, the BSA is not required to admit a female applicant for a posi-
tion as an adult leader because it iss not a discriminatory accommodation practice). Non-
profit entities arguably deserve clear statutory notice as to the Unruh Act's applicability to
them. See Steven B. Arbuss, Comment, The Unruh Civil Rights Act: An Uncertain Guar-
antee, 31 UCLA L. REV. 443, 458 (1983). It is uncertain, however, under present statutory
construction, which nonprofit entities are classified as "business establishments," and
therefore subject to the Unruh Act's provisions. See id. at 459.
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tions in statutory construction and to judicial interpretation. 0' Further,
the disparity in statutory definitions of "place of public accommodation"
has led to extensive litigation.2°2
Legislatures may craft the definition of covered organizations under a
public accommodation statute in one of three ways.2 °3 The first method
of construction is a long, specific, laundry-list of covered institutions,
which enumerates institutions and entities that are within the reach of
the statute, but provides no qualifying language extending the coverage
201. See Varela, supra note 193, at 934-36 (stating that a legislature's precision in de-
fining what constitutes a place of public accommodation is determinative of the scope of
the statute); see also Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 14 (Amy Gutmann,
ed., 1997) (lamenting the fact that the judiciary has no clear-cut, intelligible theory of
statutory interpretation). Justice Scalia attributes the absence of a framework for statu-
tory interpretation to the modern method of legal instruction, where no classes are re-
quired on statutory interpretation, and the process of interpretation "is left to be picked
up piecemeal, through the reading of cases (good and bad) in substantive fields of law that
happen to involve statutes[.]" Id. at 14-15. Justice Scalia further emphasizes the shortage
of treatises on the subject and the apathetic attitude of legal scholars as to whether there
are acceptable rules of statutory interpretation. See id.
202. See supra Parts I.B-II (detailing several cases involving only the BSA). There has
also been litigation in several jurisdictions concerning the United States Jaycees, the Ro-
tary Club, and multiple other entities. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 612, 630-31 (1984) (holding that the Minnesota Human Rights Act was not unconsti-
tutionally vague or overbroad and that the Jaycees were forbidden from denying women
regular membership under the statute). The Jaycees are a nonprofit national membership
organization. See id. at 612. Like the Boy Scouts, the Jaycees espouse their educational
and charitable purposes of encouraging personal development and civic interest in young
men. See id.
Rotary International is a nonprofit corporation that, as an organization of business and
professional men, sought to provide humanitarian services and encourage business ethics.
See Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (holding
that California's Unruh Act is constitutional, and upholding the California court's decision
that the Rotary Club was a public accommodation and thus was required to admit
women). The Rotary Club did not warrant First Amendment constitutional protection
because it was not an intimate or private organization. See id. at 546. The Supreme Court
based this decision largely on the fact that one of the main purposes of Rotary Interna-
tional was to build a large membership that was representative of the business community.
See id. It also considered that the organization did not keep its business private. See id.
In addition to inciting litigation that reached the Supreme Court, public accommodation
statutes have also produced lengthy state litigation. See, e.g., Curran v. Mount Diablo
Council of the Boy Scouts, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), appeal dismissed,
Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scouts of Am. v. Curran, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984), appeal after
remand, Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1994), reh'g denied, (1994), review granted & opinion superseded by Curran v. Mount
Diablo Council of Boy Scouts of Am., 874 P.2d 901 (Cal. 1994), aff'd, Curran v. Mount
Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998).
203. See Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 7, at 241.
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of the statute to other institutions.2 ' The second manner is a long, spe-
cific list that extends the statute's coverage beyond being merely illustra-
tive or exclusive through the addition of such language as "coverage 'in-
cludes but is not limited to"' before the list.05 Therefore, the statute
applies to other, non-listed organizations.'06 Finally, a statute may em-
ploy a general characterization, which extends coverage to a certain class
207
of establishments that provide a certain service, or to a certain class.
Despite these categories, there is little correlation between the construc-
208
tion of the definition and the breadth of the statute.
Further, even though different statutory constructions exist, the form
utilized presents little opportunity for predictability as to how a court will
classify a particular organization.O For instance, California's Unruh
Civil Rights Act2' contains a general definition, while the New Jersey. . . 211 r' . . 212
Law Against Discrimination and Kansas' Act Against Discrimination
utilize a long, specific list and state expressly that a place of public ac-
commodation is not limited to the listed institutions.213 The structure of
the definitions in the statutes provides no predictability when courts in
204. See id.
205. Id. at 243.
206. See id. The statute covers additional institutions because the second formulation
demonstrates by giving examples, but does not confine coverage to those examples. See
id.
207. See id. at 242; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(H) (Michie 1993). The New Mexico
Human Rights Act covers "any establishment that provides or offers its services, facilities,
accommodations, or goods to the public, but does not include a bona fide private club or
other place or establishment which is by its nature and use distinctly private[.]" Id. An-
other example is California's statute, which encompasses "all business establishments of
every kind whatsoever." CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982 & Supp. 2000); see supra note
76 (setting out the text of the Unruh Civil Rights Act).
208. See Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 7, at 241 (observing that a statute that con-
tains a long, specific list may be interpreted to be narrower than the other forms of con-
struction, unless amendments have been added to accommodate social change). "[I]t
should not be assumed that any particular category of accommodations is covered because
a statute is drafted in a certain form." Id.
209. See, e.g., Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218,
229-38 (Cal. 1998) (Curran II) (construing a general definition in the Unruh Act to ex-
clude the BSA from the Act's coverage); Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d. 1196, 1208-
13 (N.J. 1999) (Dale If) (finding a long, qualified list to apply to the BSA).
210. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.
211. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(l) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); see supra note 130 (setting
out the definition of a place of public accommodation).
212. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1001, 44-1002 (1993 & Supp. 1998) (defining public ac-
commodation); see supra note 88 and accompanying text (setting out the relevant text of
the statute).
213. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1002 ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(l).
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respective jurisdictions apply the statutes to the Boy Scouts. 2 14
In Curran, the plaintiff presented the California court with numerous
examples of BSA activities that one could construe as business deal-
ings.2 " These ranged from transactions with nonmembers on a regular
basis through the operation of retail shops that sell T-shirts, patches, uni-
forms, equipment, publications, and other official scouting items to the
licensing and use of the BSA insignia. 6 The activities also included one
council's business contact with members through a full-time staff of
twenty-two individuals and an additional thirty-person summer staff, an
annual budget of over $1.7 million, and retail stores.27 Despite the Cur-
ran courts' recognition that the term "business establishment" is subject
to a broad interpretation,2 8 the court held that such evidence did not
make the Boy Scouts a business establishment. 29 Therefore, in Califor-
nia, the BSA is not a place of public accommodation.2 0  This decision
was surprising given the language of the statute that appears to be more
inclusive.22 The Curran court, however, viewed the BSA as "charitable,
214. See Dale H, 734 A.2d at 1208-13 (construing the LAD, with its definition of a
public accommodation in the form of a long, qualified list, to require the BSA to alter its
discriminatory membership practices); see also Curran II, 952 P.2d at 229-38 (deciding that
the BSA did not meet the requirements to be a "business establishment" under the gen-
eral definition of California's Unruh Act); Seabourn v. Coronado Area Council, Boy
Scouts of Am., 891 P.2d 385, 403-06 (Kan. 1995) (holding that the Kansas statute, which
defines public accommodation in the form of a long, qualified list, did not apply to the
BSA).
215. See Curran II, 952 P.2d at 223, 238.
216. See id.
217. See id. at 223.
218. See id. at 236 (citing Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 370 P.2d 313 (Cal. 1962) for the
proposition that past decisions of the California Supreme Court have emphasized that the
term must "properly be interpreted 'in the broadest sense reasonably possible"').
219. See id. at 238.
220. See id. (emphasizing that the BSA's participation in business transactions is su-
perceded in importance by its function as an expressive social organization). The organi-
zation's "primary function is the inculcation of values in its youth members, and whose
small social group structure and activities are not comparable to those of a traditional
place of public accommodation or amusement." Id.
221. See Arbuss, supra note 200, at 450-51 (delineating the history of California's anti-
discrimination statute). Before 1959, California's statute had the structure of a long list
qualified by the clause: "and all other places of public accommodation or amusement."
See id. at 449-50 n.32 (citing Act of May 28, 1923, ch. 235, § 1, 1923 CAL. STAT. 485, origi-
nally enacted as Act of Mar. 13, 1897, ch. 108, 1897 CAL. STAT. 137). Notwithstanding the
state courts' contention that the statute wag to be liberally construed, a line of cases in the
1950s limited its application. See id. at 450. The legislature then revised the statute in
1959 in response to public disapproval of the decisions, and named the new statute the
Unruh Civil Rights Act. See id. at 450-51. Arbuss noted that "[t]he clear intent of the
legislature in so acting was to increase the number of places where discrimination was pro-
scribed." Id. at 451.
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expressive, and social," and thus found that the statute did not apply to
222the organization.
Similarly, in Seabourn v. Coronado Area Council, Boy Scouts of
221America, the Kansas Supreme Court stated that although the state
"abhors discrimination,, 224 the legislative intent of Kansas' Act Against
Discrimination was to encompass all businesses "which can reasonably
be described as offering goods, services, facilities, and accommodations
to the public., 225 The Seabourn court derived this interpretation from
Kansas' statute, which contains a long, specific list of institutions, and a
caveat that the list was not exclusive.226 Despite a non-exclusive list, the
227court exempted the Boy Scouts from the statute's coverage.
In contrast, the New Jersey Supreme Court has construed its state's
statute liberally throughout a long line of cases. 28 The court examined
222. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 236
(Cal. 1998) (Curran II) (explaining that the activities of the BSA are not related to "the
promotion or advancement of the economic or business interests of its members").
223. 891 P.2d 385 (Kan. 1995); see supra Part I.B.3 (setting out the facts of the case).
224. Seabourn, 891 P.2d at 403.
225. Id.; see also Kansas Comm'n on Civil Rights v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 P.2d
1263, 1269-70 (Kan. 1975) (establishing the policy as to the application of the Kansas Act
Against Discrimination). The Kansas Supreme Court in Seabourn dismissed any argu-
ment that the Boy Scouts fell under the exception in Kansas' statute for a nonprofit fra-
ternal or social association or corporation, and instead found that the BSA is not open to
the general public. Seabourn, 891 P.2d at 392.
226. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1002 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
227. See Seabourn, 891 P.2d at 406 (emphasizing that "the Boy Scouts has no business
purpose other than maintaining the objectives and programs to which the operation of fa-
cilities is merely incidental").
228. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1208 (N.J. 1999) (Dale 11) (citing
Andersen v. Exxon Co., 446 A.2d 486, 492 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1982) (internal citation omitted)).
The Dale court stated: "We have adhered to that legislative mandate by historically and
consistently interpreting the LAD 'with that high degree of liberality which comports with
the preeminent social significance of its purposes and objects."' Id.; see also N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 10:5-3 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999) ("[D]iscrimination threatens not only the rights
and proper privileges of the inhabitants of [New Jersey,] but menaces the institutions and
foundation of a free democratic state."). The places of public accommodation listed in the
New Jersey statute are not the sole places of public accommodation, given that the use of
the word "include" before the list of specific "places" was meant to encompass other ac-
commodations that were similar to those listed. See, e.g., Fraser v. Robin Dee Day Camp,
210 A.2d 208, 211 (N.J. 1965); National Org. of Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 318
A.2d 33, 37 (N.J Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974), aftd, 338 A.2d 198 (N.J. 1974) (affirming that
"[t]he statutory noun 'place'. . . is a term of convenience, not of limitation[,]... employed
to reflect the fact that public accommodations are commonly provided at fixed 'places."').
The Little League decision relied on the revised public accommodation statute which read
that a place of public accommodation "shall include but not be limited to" the enumerated
examples. See
318 A.2d at 38; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5. New Jersey had been a leader in fighting
to eliminate invidious discrimination-it adopted the LAD in 1945, nearly 20 years before
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the activities of the BSA, including its fundraising and its solicitation of
229members in several advertising media. It also considered the BSA's
close ties to federal and state governmental bodies as well as to covered
public accommodations, including schools.230  After considering all of
these factors, the New Jersey court deviated from California and Kansas'
interpretations and held that, in New Jersey, the BSA is a public accom-
modation.23'
B. Undefined Statutory Exemptions: Another Obstacle for Clear
Decisions
In addition to unclear definitions and differences in statutory form,
statutory exemptions to the antidiscrimination laws often perplex the
122courts. Legislatures have created categories in the statutes that deline-
ate certain groups, including private clubs, religious organizations, and
sexually segregated accommodations for which the statute is inapplica-
ble.233 State legislatures promulgated these exemptions in recognition of
an individual's right to have intimate and private relationships. This
Congress passed Title II. See James L. Fennessy, Comment, New Jersey Law and Police
Response to the Exclusion of Minority Patrons From Retail Stores Based on the Mere Sus-
picion of Shoplifting, 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 549 (1999). The LAD "is one of the old-
est and most sweeping civil rights laws in the nation." Id. at 567.
229. See Dale II, 734 A.2d at 1211.
230. See id. at 1211-13 (reviewing the contact that the BSA has with the military, pub-
lic schools, community colleges, state and local governments, and local government agen-
cies).
231. See id. at 1230.
232. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(l). The statute reads:
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to include or to apply to any institu-
tion, bona fide club, or place of accommodation, which is in its nature distinctly
private; nor shall anything herein contained apply to any educational facility op-
erated or maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institution,.., nor shall
anything herein contained be construed to bar any private secondary or post-
secondary school from using in good faith criteria other than race, creed, color,
national origin, ancestry or affectional or sexual orientation, in the admission of
students.
Id.; see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1002(h) (1993 & Supp. 1998) ("Public accommoda-
tions do not include a religious or nonprofit fraternal or social association or corpora-
tion.").
233. See Arbuss, supra note 200, at 449 n.30 (providing examples of state-enacted ex-
emptions).
234. See id. at 467 n.124 (explaining that, theoretically, a private club's membership
policy is protected by the constitutional right to freedom of association and the right of
privacy); Koppen, supra note 15, at 649 (explaining that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ex-
pressly exempts private clubs from its coverage).
The Supreme Court's decision in Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary
Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) illustrates that state legislatures promulgated exemp-
tions in recognition of an individual's right to have intimate and private relationships. The
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right is grounded in the First Amendment freedoms of expression and
association.35
The most frequently employed exception is the private club exemp-
236tion. Unfortunately, despite a goal of forwarding members' rights of
association and expression, legislative efforts provide more confusion
than protection.237  These exceptions compel courts to grapple with
whether organizations, including the Boy Scouts, are private clubs,238
Rotary Court recognized the freedom to enter into "certain intimate or private relation-
ships" as a fundamental right under the Bill of Rights. See id. at 545. The Court quoted its
decision in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984) where it acknowl-
edged protection for relationships that involve "deep attachments and commitments to the
necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life." Id.
Both Rotary & Roberts emphasized the importance of undertaking a careful evaluation of
the parameters of state authority to regulate an individual's freedom to associate. See id.
In furtherance of the constitutional protection of intimate relationships, Congress and
state legislatures have emphasized the need for protection, but have also mandated that
the courts only extend such protection to bona fide private organizations. See Koppen,
supra note 15, at 654-55. This is evidenced by Senator Humphrey's testimony during the
debate over Title II's private club exemption: "We intend only to protect the genuine pri-
vacy of private clubs or other establishments whose membership is genuinely selective on
some reasonable basis." 110 CONG. REC. 13,697 (1964).
235. See Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 7, at 250-51. The United States Constitu-
tion does not mandate that the states exempt private clubs from coverage. See id. In fact,
although Title II contains a private club exemption, it defers to state law on the issue of
antidiscrimination laws. See id. at 251. A state may therefore refuse to include such an
exemption and the organization will be subject to the state's antidiscrimination law. See
id.
236. Cf. Varela, supra note 193, at 934. Less than half the states exempt private clubs
from their public accommodation statute. See id. This is a recent trend because, as of
1970, all states with public accommodation statutes implicitly or explicitly exempted pri-
vate clubs. See id. at 934 n.103.
237. See Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 7, at 251-52 (pointing to the state courts'
lack of decisiveness on the issue of the private club exemption). There is also significant
divisiveness on the issue of the proper method for the evaluation of private organization
status. See Koppen, supra note 15, at 656. The Fourth Circuit deemed the issue a question
of fact, and the majority of courts adhere to this standard. See id. (discussing Nesmith v.
Y.W.C.A. of Raleigh, 397 F.2d 96, 98-100 (4th Cir. 1968)). The Fifth Circuit, however,
found the determination of private club status to be "'a question of law once the underly-
ing facts are determined."' Id. at 656-57 (quoting with approval United States v. Richberg,
398 F.2d 523, 525-26 (5th Cir. 1968)). Treating the term as an issue of law will lead to a
different interpretation of the term with every case. See id. Designating the definition of
"private club" as an issue of law will afford appellate courts more latitude to determine
the issue on appeal, since issues of law are reviewed de novo. See id. at 657. Greater
authority on the part of the appellate courts will resolve discrepancies in lower court deci-
sions. See id.
238. One commentator noted the existence of a "hodgepodge of bases for suits, courts
and rules" because litigants may raise the private club exemption under state and federal
law. See Koppen, supra note 15, at 657. There are many components that courts use to
reach their determinations of whether an organization falls under a statute's exemption for
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largely because the legislatures draft the exemptions ambiguously.139 For
instance, New Jersey's statute exempts "any institution, bona fide club,
or place of accommodation, which is in its nature distinctly private''240 but
does not define "distinctly private. ,14' This determination is imperative
in determining statutory coverage, because an organization that offers
accommodations to the public is subject to the applicable public accom-
modation statute, and is no longer private.14' Nevertheless, some statutes
do not provide clear definitions, leaving courts with little direction on the
issue and further confusing public accommodation litigation.243
private clubs. See id. These include: genuine selectivity of the group in the admission of
members, including objective standards for admission; formality of admission procedures;
membership control over member selection; statistics concerning denial of membership;
numerical limit on membership and membership fees; membership control over opera-
tions of establishment; history of the organization; use of facilities by nonmembers; club's
purpose for formation and continuing; club advertisement; profit or non-profit organiza-
tions; observed formalities; general characteristics of private clubs; operation for the sole
benefit of members; and public funding. See id. at 657-75. See, e.g., Dale v. Boy Scouts of
Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1213-17 (N.J. 1999) (Dale II) (weighing arguments concerning the
BSA's membership policies and size and determining that while the BSA is a bona fide
club, it is not distinctly private). The BSA, therefore, did not fall under the New Jersey
statute's private club exemption. See id.; see also Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 7, at
251 (finding that courts have weighed criteria such as "advertising, profit orientation,
openness to the public, and the general purpose of the facility").
239. See Arbuss, supra note 200, at 467-68 (advocating the need to clarify the defini-
tion of private organization under the California Unruh Act). Discriminating businesses
would reorganize into "clubs" in order to avoid falling under the applicable public ac-
commodation statute. See, e.g., Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 301-02 (1969) (finding that a
place of amusement that awarded membership based on race was not member-owned and
had no self-governing provisions, and therefore was not a private club under Title II).
240. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(l) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).
241. Id.; see also id. § 10:5-5 note (SENATE STATE GOV'T, FEDERAL AND
INTERSTATE RELATIONS AND VETERANS AFFAIRS, COMM. STATEMENT, S. 1608-L.1977,
c. 122) (providing some guidance on legislative intent, which is absent from the statutory
provision). The statement announced that
[t]he definitions section of the statute, as it now stands, excludes a club which is
exclusively social "or a fraternal, charitable, educational or religious association
or corporation, if such club, association or corporation is not organized and oper-
ated for private profit," from the preview of the provisions pertaining to dis-
crimination in employment.
Id.
242. See Arbuss, supra note 200, at 468.
243. See supra note 232 (setting out the text of the New Jersey and Kansas club ex-
emptions). There is a clear lack of clarification in New Jersey's exemption of a "distinctly
private" organization. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(l). This nebulous statement has given
rise to litigation, such as Dale v. Boy Scouts of America. The Supreme Court provided fac-
tors that a court should use in considering a club's private or public status. See Board of
Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987); Roberts v. Jay-
cees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984). These factors include "size, purpose, selectivity, and
whether others are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship." Rotary, 481 U.S. at
546 (applying Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620). These factors, however, have not provided con-
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C. "Place" is a Crucial Term When Interpreting the Statute
A further frustration with public accommodation statutes is the failure
of legislatures to provide a coherent definition of "place. '' 2" Several
cases have focused on whether "place" refers to a physical situs, and
many courts have tied the applicability of the statute to groups that meet
site.24 Other courts, however, have noted that "places do notat a regular  te rs e  entdtht"lcsd 
discriminate; people who own and operate places do.,
246
The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed this issue directly in Dale
when it noted that the legislature had made multiple alterations to the
LAD, but had never clarified the definition of "place" to make it more
crete guidance for the courts, since the BSA's status as a private organization has not been
uniform throughout the litigation in which it has been involved. Compare Welsh v. Boy
Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1276-77 (7th Cir. 1993) (Welsh IV) (holding that the BSA is
not a public accommodation, but if it were, it would be exempt under the private club ex-
ception to Title II), with Dale 11, 734 A.2d at 1213-18 (finding that the BSA does not fall
under the distinctly private exception).
244. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-63 (1995) (providing an ambiguous definition
of public accommodation). The statute states:
"Place of public accommodation, resort or amusement" means any establishment
which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public, in-
cluding, but not limited to, any commercial property or building lot, on which it is
intended that a commercial building will be constructed or offered for sale or
rent[.]"
Id.
245. See Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Commission on Human Rights and
Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352, 357 (Conn. 1987) (concluding that the legislature linked its
definition of "place" with the term "any establishment" in the statute, rather than a site).
The Quinnipiac court found this construction sufficiently ambiguous to consider extrinsic
evidence. See id. The court stated that "[i]nquiry into the statute's legislative history
makes it exceedingly doubtful that linkage to a physical site is a necessary element of the
present definition of a 'place of public accommodation."' Id. This was due to the legisla-
ture's repeated amendments that enlarged the scope of the statute. See id. The original
statute contained a specific list of qualified enterprises, but the legislature amended this
formulation in 1953 to be phrased as a general definition: "any establishment which caters
or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public." Id. at 358 (quoting CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 2464c (Supp. 1953)). The court found that "the unconditional language of
the statute, the history of its steadily expanded coverage, and the compelling interest in
eliminating discriminatory public accommodation practices persuade us that physical situs
is not today an essential element of our public accommodation law." Id. at 358; see also
Dale 11, 734 A.2d at 1210 (noting the discrepancies between interpretations of "place").
246. Welsh IV, 993 F.2d at 1282 (Cummings, C.J., dissenting); see also Quinnipiac,
528 A.2d at 358 (declaring that "our statute now regulates the discriminatory conduct and
not the discriminatory situs of an enterprise which offers its services to the general pub-
lic").
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limiting.147 This ruling follows New Jersey precedent.14s For example, the
New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed a decision that the Little League is
a place of public accommodation, even though it does not operate at a
physical structure, such as a building; therefore, the Little League could
not exclude girls who wished to join.249 An earlier case held that a day
camp was a public accommodation even before the statute included day
250camps; thus, it could not discriminate based on race.
The New Jersey decisions, however, are in sharp contrast to the ap-
proach taken by other jurisdictions, which emphasize the importance of
interpreting statutes according to their plain meaning.21 The disparate
247. See Dale H, 734 A.2d at 1210 (emphasizing that the legislature's failure to alter
the definition of place was tacit support of the judicial interpretation that place was not
constricted to a physical place). The Dale II court cited Massachusetts Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Manzo, 584 A.2d 190, 201 (N.J. 1990), which stated that "'[t]he Legislature's
failure to modify a judicial determination, while not dispositive, is some evidence of legis-
lative support for the judicial construction of a statute ... [especially when] the Legislature
has amended [the] statute several times without altering the judicial construction." Id.
248. See, e.g., Frank v. Ivy Club, 576 A.2d 241, 249, 257 (N.J. 1990) (finding a private
eating club to be a public accommodation because of its symbiotic relationship with the
university, when the university was a public accommodation); Clover Hill Swimming Club
v. Goldsboro, 219 A.2d 161, 166 (N.J. 1966) (construing an incorporated swimming club to
be a public accommodation, and not a private club); National Org. for Women, Essex
County Chapter v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1974), affld, 338 A.2d 198 (N.J. 1974) (holding that the LAD should be applied to little
league baseball fields; therefore, the organization cannot prohibit females to join).
249. See Little League, 318 A.2d at 37-39. The Appellate Division of the Superior
Court of New Jersey decreed that because the Little League held out an invitation to chil-
dren in the community with no limitation (except for sex), it was a public accommodation
and therefore could not discriminate on the basis of sex. See id. at 37-38.
The statutory noun "place" (of public accommodation) is a term of convenience,
not of limitation. It is employed to reflect the fact that public accommodations
are commonly provided at fixed "places".... The "place" of public accommo-
dation in the case of Little League is obviously the ball field at which tryouts are
arranged, instructions given, practices held and games played.
Id. at 37.
250. See Fraser v. Robin Dee Day Camp, 210 A.2d 208, 211-12 (N.J. 1965) (finding the
day camp to be a public accommodation because it was similar to other recreational and
educational institutions listed in the statute). The court stated: "A day camp is essentially
an educational-recreational accommodation for children. We therefore think it clear that
respondent's day camp is the type of accommodation which the Legislature intended to
reach." Id. at 212.
251. See Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1269 (7th Cir. 1993) (Welsh IV)
(resolving that a statute should be interpreted by considering the ordinary meaning of the
words used).
A reading of [Title II] for its plain meaning renders but one conclusion: Congress
when enacting § 2000a(b) never intended to include membership organizations
that do not maintain a close connection to a structural facility within the meaning
of "place of public accommodation." The statute clearly governs only an entity
that: (1) "serves the public" and (2) may be classified as an "establishment,"
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interpretations are in conflict because New Jersey emphasizes the need
for a liberal interpretation in light of the statute's goal of eradicating dis-
crimination, while other jurisdictions construe "place" to limit the
scope of the statute using a plain meaning interpretation. Clearly,
clarification is necessary.254
When a court finds that a statute is ambiguous on its face, it will con-
sider the legislative intent behind the statute to interpret the statute's
"place," or "facility."
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)). The court refused to override the strong presumption
accorded to the canon that the plain language of a statute expresses the legislative intent,
and found that the presumption can only be rebutted in the face of rare circumstances
where a contrary intent is explicit. See id. at 1270. Because the Supreme Court stated in
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1969) that the purpose of Title II was to eliminate
discrimination in "facilities ostensibly open to the general public," and because it is not the
prerogative of the judicial branch to do more than interpret the law, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals flatly refused to expand the statute beyond the ordinary meaning of the
term "place." Id. at 1270-71.
252. See Dale 1I, 734 A.2d at 1208. "Certainly, if the statute is broadly applicable, the
antidiscriminatory impact of its provisions is greater. The Legislature's finding that the
effects of discrimination are pernicious, and its directive to liberally construe the LAD,
have informed our cases interpreting the reach of 'place of public accommodation."' Id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court noted that other jurisdictions also do not interpret
"place" narrowly. See id. at 1210. The court cited New York and Minnesota decisions
which applied place to "'the place where [the organizations] do what they do,' including
'the place where [the organizations'] meetings and activities occur."' Id. (citing United
States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 452 N.E.2d 1199, 1204 (N.Y.
1983) and United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 773 (Minn. 1981)). The
Minnesota Supreme Court stated that "a 'place of public accommodation' ... is less a mat-
ter of whether the organization operates on a permanent site, and more a matter of
whether the organization engages in activities in places to which an unselected public is
given an open invitation." Id. (referring to the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in
Little League).
253. See supra Part I.B.1 (explaining the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals); see also United States Jaycees v. Richardset, 666 P.2d 1008, 1011 (Alaska 1983)
(confining its statute to its interpretation of "place," which it found "would not encompass
a service organization lacking a fixed geographical situs"); United States Jaycees v. Massa-
chusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 463 N.E.2d 1151, 1156 (Mass. 1984) (refusing to
extend the scope of Massachusetts' antidiscrimination statute to membership organiza-
tions because "such an organization does not fall within the commonly accepted definition
of a 'place"').
254. Cf. Scalia, supra note 201, at 16 (questioning the rule of statutory construction
that investigation into the meaning of a statute stops when the meaning is clear on the face
of the statute). Justice Scalia raised this point because the admitted purpose of statutory
interpretation is to ascertain the legislative intent behind the promulgation of the statute.
See id. He emphasized that seemingly contradictory canons of interpretation exist, but
that each canon is one approach, and that it must yield to other approaches if they are
more appropriate. See id. at 27; see also Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Ap-
pellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed,
3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950) (explaining that there are two opposing canons on every
point).
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language.2 ' Despite this maxim, absent an explicit statement of legisla-
tive intent in the statute, the court must extrapolate what it perceives to
be the intent from committee reports or other legislative history.256
Given that the court's examination is already extensive due to the factors
described above, it is clear that the failure of the legislature to include a
statement of intent further exacerbates the process of determining the
statute's scope.257
IV. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION STATUTES REQUIRE REVISION TO
EFFECTUATE THE GOAL OF ELIMINATING DISCRIMINATION
As is evident from the problems enumerated above, legislatures must
act to clarify the statutes."' Given that the goal of public accommodationstatutes is to eradicate the invidious "cancer of discrimination, 259
255. Compare Welsh IV, 993 F.2d at 1270 (employing the canon that one must, if pos-
sible, find the legislative intent in the plain meaning of the statute), with Curran v. Mount
Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 229 (Cal. 1998) (Curran II) (find-
ing the term "business establishment" to be unclear on the face of California's antidis-
crimination statute and therefore turning to the legislative history of the statute to find the
legislature's intent).
256. See Varela, supra note 193, at 935 (stating that the judiciary has an easier task if a
statement of intent is present); cf. Scalia, supra note 201, at 29-37 (finding that reliance on
legislative history to interpret statutes is an imprecise and unreliable method of interpreta-
tion). The traditional English and American practice of interpretation eschewed such an
approach because the individual motivations of legislators do not capture the force of the
statute itself; instead, one should find the will of the statute in its words. See id. at 30.
Legislative dissatisfaction with the judiciary's use of "legislative intent" and feigned can-
ons of interpretation as a tool to force their own views resulted in the growth of legislative
history as an interpretive device in America in the 1920s and 1930s. See id. Scalia finds
fault in legislative history for two main reasons. First, lawyers routinely substitute legisla-
tive history for the actual statutory text as support for their arguments. See id. at 31-35.
Second, committee reports and other legislative documents are often neither written nor
read by the members of Congress who supposedly penned them. See id. (supporting his
argument with an amusing, although embarrassing Senate transcript quoted in one of Jus-
tice Scalia's D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals opinions, wherein Senator Dole could not iden-
tify any senator who had written a report for the Senate Finance Committee, and further
stated that he had not read the report in its entirety).
257. See Varela, supra note 193, at 935.
258. Cf Perlman, supra note 4, at 127-39 (outlining an approach to clarify the stat-
utes). Mr. Perlman suggests that the implications of an organization's right of association,
compared with the prospective member's right to associate with the organization, consti-
tute an important constitutional consideration that courts should examine in determining
the applicability of a public accommodation statute to the organization. See id. at 115-16.
In fact, "courts and commentators have underestimated the constitutional scope of public
accommodation laws and unduly limited the permissible breadth of such statutes. This
absence of adequate constitutional boundaries for such laws reflects a failure to acknowl-
edge the dual nature of the freedom of association." Id. at 143-44.
259. Fuchilla v. Layman, 537 A.2d 652, 660 (N.J. 1988) (quoting Jackson v. Concord
Co., 253 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1969)); see also Varela, supra note 193, at 919 ("The eradication
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changes in the field are imperative in order to provide courts with consis-
tent direction.26' Further, the adherence to definitions in statutes, some
of which are decades old, could perpetuate archaic public policies. 26'
Most courts are reluctant to expand the scope of their state's public ac-
commodation statute because the augmentation of statutes is the purview
of the legislature.262 Consequently, the most effective manner to forward
the goal of public accommodation statutes on a nationwide level is for
the American Law Institute (ALI) to draft a Restatement of AntiDis-
crimination Law, or for the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws to draft a uniform state statute.263
Through an examination of the necessary components of public ac-
commodation statutes, focusing on the goal of eliminating discrimination
and the concerns voiced by state legislatures as they drafted their original
statutes, the ALl or the National Conference of Commissioners could
formulate an effective statute. This statute could then provide notice to
organizations and their prospective members as to exactly where they fall
on the spectrum of public accommodations, as well as furnish guidance to
of invidious discrimination is a great ideal of modern government, both federal and
state."). Furthermore, eliminating discrimination "plainly serves compelling state interests
of the highest order." Id. at 919 n.1 (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
624 (1984)); see also Perlman, supra note 4, at 119-20 (describing the interests implicated
in public accommodation statutes). "[Plublic accommodation statutes serve at least three
interests: (1) the interest in equal treatment traditionally associated with these statutes;
(2) the promotion of human flourishing; and (3) the protection of human dignity." Id.; see
also Arbuss, supra note 200, at 465. Other goals of public accommodation statutes are "to
eliminate arbitrary discrimination by entities which purport to serve the general public and
to prevent the humiliation and psychological injury suffered by individuals who experience
discrimination." Id. (citations omitted).
260. See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text (describing the opposite ap-
proaches to interpreting the term "place").
261. See Singer, supra note 13, at 1423 (cautioning against "rigidly enforcing outdated
conceptions" of the definition of a place of public accommodation).
262. Cf Arbuss, supra note 200, at 464-65 (suggesting that a legislative amendment
should be made to broaden the scope of California's public accommodation statute). The
recommended course of action is legislative, instead of judicial, because the legislature is
accountable to the electorate. See id.; see also Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267,
1270-71 (7th Cir. 1993) (Welsh IV). The court asserted:
We as judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals have only the power to interpret the
law; it is the duty of the legislative branch to make the law. We must "refuse[] to
infringe on the legislative prerogative of enacting statutes to implement public
policy.... 'The problems of public policy... are for the legislature' and. . . 'our
job is one of interpreting statutes, not redrafting them."'
Id.
263. The ALl has drafted several restatements and model codes in the past to resolve
conflicting state statutes. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE (1985); RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW OF PROPERTY (1993); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
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courts presiding over related litigation. 264 Further, a clearer statute would
eliminate the need for much litigation.
A. A Public Accommodation Should Not be Defined by its Link to a
Physical Site
The first consideration in drafting the statute must be its scope; specifi-
cally, what entities the statute prohibits from discriminating in their ac-
26tivities. Once the scope is determined, the drafting body should for-
mulate precise definitions to clearly illustrate the statute's purpose.261
Next, the Institute or the Conference must determine a structure for the
definition of public accommodation. Then it must delineate the excep-
tions to the statute, again through clear definitions. A key principle,
which the drafter's must consider throughout the drafting process, is the
determination that the statutory definition of a public accommodation
cannot be tied to physical situs.268 This determination is paramount be-
cause it looms as a central issue in public accommodation cases, often
driving conflicting results.
2 69
Mandating that a public accommodation be tied to a physical place is
an illogical requirement because public accommodation laws have their
roots in common law principles that prohibited discrimination by com-
mon carriers, innkeepers, and other entities that furnished services to the
264. The Dale decision has already caused turmoil for private organizations because
they are now unsure what affect the decision will have on their ability to select members.
See Assaulting the Boy Scouts, VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS MAG., Oct. 1, 1999, at 8.
An article in the Veterans of Foreign Wars Magazine posited that "[i]f BSA membership
eligibility can be mandated by judicial edict, then the membership standards of every pri-
vate social service organization can be challenged as discriminatory based on the defini-
tion of 'public accommodation."' Id. Others have called for Supreme Court review of the
Dale case. Id.
265. See Arbuss, supra note 200, at 452 (quoting Mohr & Weber, The Unruh Civil
Rights Act: Just How Far Does it Reach?, 11 BEv. HILLS B. Ass'N J. 32-33 (1977)). The
imprecise definition of "business establishments" in California's Unruh Act is an "invita-
tion to litigation." Id.
266. See Varela, supra note 193, at 951. "[S]tate and local legislatures need to draft the
definition of public accommodation as precisely as possible. The legislature must first
have an idea of what type of organization it seeks to integrate through its" public accom-
modation statute. Id.
267. See id.
268. Compare National Org. of Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d 33, 37
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (emphasizing that the construction of the term "place"
should not be limited to a concrete situs), with Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 787 F. Supp.
1511, 1534 (N.D. 111. 1992) (Welsh III) (interpreting the legislative history of Title II and
concluding that the Act excludes organizations that lack a physical site).
269. See Welsh I11, 787 F. Supp. at 1534; Little League, 318 A.2d at 37.
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public.2 0  Since common carriers are by definition transient, they are
analogous to an entity that acts in several locations, rather than at one
specific site, such as a little league baseball organization. In addition,
courts have commented on the absence of reason in mandating that a
public accommodation is solely a static place because it is individuals
who discriminate, and the presence of a permanent building does not af-
fect the severity of the discrimination.2 2 Finally, the drafters should con-
sider that "place of public accommodation" has become a term of art,
and therefore lawmakers should no longer define "place" separately by
its traditional meaning.273
270. See Arbuss, supra note 200, at 444-45. This early designation of inns as a public
accommodation has its basis in the fact that inns held themselves out as open to the public.
See Singer, supra note 13, at 1318 (asserting that "[hiolding oneself out as open to the
public, one simply should do what one has undertaken to do, especially when others rely
on you to fulfill your role.").
271. See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 205 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "common carrier" as
"[a] carrier that is required by law to transport passengers or freight, without refusal, if the
approved fare or charge is paid. - Also termed public carrier."); see also Little League, 318
A.2d at 37 (finding ball fields to be sufficient to qualify under the definition of place).
272. See Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc. v. Commission on Human
Rights and Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352, 357-58 (Conn. 1987). The Supreme Court of
Connecticut was forced to use legislative history to interpret the ambiguous term "place"
in the public accommodation statute. See id. The court concluded that the legislature
linked "place" with "any establishment" rather than a site. See id. at 357. The court con-
cluded that the Connecticut statute "regulates the discriminatory conduct and not the dis-
criminatory situs of an enterprise which offers its services to the general public." Id. at
358. But see Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1269 (7th Cir, 1993) (Welsh IV)
(concluding that the plain meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) conveyed that Congress did
not intend to include "membership organizations that do not maintain a close connection
to a structural facility within the meaning of 'place of public accommodation').
273. According to canons of traditional statutory construction, "[w]ords and phrases
which have received judicial construction before enactment are to be understood accord-
ing to their construction," unless "the statute clearly requires them to have a different
meaning." Llewellyn, supra note 254, at 403. Further, while "[w]ords are to be taken in
their ordinary meaning unless they are technical terms or words of art," "[p]opular words
may bear a technical meaning and technical words may have a popular signification and
they should be so construed as to agree with evident intention or to make the statute op-
erate." Id. at 404. Contrast these canons, however, with two others: "every word and
clause must be given effect," and "if inadvertently inserted or if repugnant to the rest of
the statute, they may be rejected as surplusage." Id. These last two can be reconciled by
agreeing that "place of public accommodation" has become a term of art, and therefore
the entire unit should be treated as a phrase, instead of considering each word separately.
Id. Further, contrast different definitions of "place" provided by Webster's Dictionary.
See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 1727 (1993).
The definitions include: "a building or locality used for a special purpose," "an indefinite
region or expanse," a "relative position in the social scale," "a proper or designated
niche," and "a normal or suitable environment," among others. Id.
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B. The Goods and Services an Entity Provides Should Determine if the
Statute is Applicable
After determining that a public accommodation is not solely one with
a fixed situs, the drafters must articulate a definition in the form of either
a general definition or a laundry list-type definition."' A general defini-
tion, coupled with carefully drafted exceptions will provide the clearest
coverage because courts would consider the characteristics of the entity
at issue and decide if it was encompassed within the category."5 This
structure will be effective because definitions in the form of lists only
supply courts with uncertainty; if a statute is in the form of a list, courts
must first determine if the entity at issue is more similar than different to
a listed entity."'
The drafters should structure the general definition, however, by a dif-
ferent approach than that traditionally used by the courts. Instead of fo-
cusing the definition on the type of establishment,277 the definition should
focus on the goods, services, or other advantages it provides.278 The
model statute should define a public accommodation as an entity that
provides goods, services, or advantages that are required, desired, or ad-
274. See Arbuss, supra note 200, at 464-65 (recommending an overhaul of California's
definition of "business establishment" to clarify the uncertainty in the present statute).
275. Cf Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 7, at 242 (explaining that general definitions
provide statutes with extensive coverage because courts "have little discretion to narrow"
the laws).
276. See generally Seabourn v. Coronado Area Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 891 P.2d
385 (Kan. 1995) (litigating a statute whose definition is a qualified list); Dale v. Boy Scouts
of Am. & Monmouth Council, 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999) (Dale II) (same). The intention
of legislatures who employ general definitions is to broaden the scope of the statute, how-
ever, more specific statutes are less ambiguous. See Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 7, at
242-43. Some commentators advocate the long qualified list as more precise than a gen-
eral definition and less arbitrary than an unqualified list. See id. at 243; Arbuss, supra note
200, at 467 (advocating the addition of an illustrative list of covered organizations to Cali-
fornia's Unruh Act).
277. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 363.01 (1998) (defining a public accommodation as "a
business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facil-
ity of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advan-
tages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold or otherwise made available to the
public."). The Supreme Court held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague or
overbroad. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629-31 (1984).
278. See Perlman, supra note 4, at 124. Perlman recommends that the constitutional
protection an organization receives for its membership selection should be based on
"whether an organization provides the kinds of goods, services, or advantages that give
public accommodation statutes their value. This way, even if a group engages in expres-
sion, the group would not receive constitutional protection if it also provides some good or
service to the public." Id.
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vantageous to the general public, and that are not directly connected to
an association's expressive purpose, if it was formed for such a purpose."'
Although there still is an element of uncertainty to this approach (for in-
stance, in defining the relevant public), at least it eliminates the compari-
son between the entity and the statutory list of establishments. For ex-
ample, instead of a court inquiring if a swimming club is analogous to
listed entities or whether it invites the public at large to join, the court
could simply conclude that public swimming facilities are an asset to the
general public, and are not part of an expressive purpose; thus, individu-
als should not be excluded.2 °
C. Clearly Defined Exemptions are Critical for Guidance to Courts and
Member Organizations
The next important consideration for the drafting body is the exemp-
tions that the statute will contain. Commonly exempted entities include
private clubs, religious entities, or religious educational entities.2 8 Al-
though not all states presently contain such a provision, the drafters
should include in the statute an exemption for genuinely private organi-
zations.m This is primarily because the Constitution protects organiza-
tions' expressive interests in both membership selection and espousing
their purpose.23 Further, such an exemption would fulfill the legislative
goals voiced during discussion of the existing public accommodation
statues, which are discernible in legislative testimony and several com-
mentators' arguments on the merits of private organizations.
279. Cf id. at 129-30 (considering the application of public accommodation statutes to
expressive organizations who provide expressive goods to their members). Perlman ar-
gues that public accommodation laws should not be applied to an organization solely be-
cause it provides some good. See id. Instead, he contends that the laws should only apply
when the good provided is not representative of the expressive purpose of the organiza-
tion, and when the good is provided as the organization's primary function. See id.
280. Cf Clover Hill Swimming Club v. Goldsboro, 219 A.2d 161, 162, 164-67 (N.J.
1966) (involving discriminatory access to a swimming pool).
281. See Arbuss, supra note 200, at 467-68 (describing the Unruh Act's exemptions);
see, e.g., Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 787 F. Supp. 1511, 1535 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (Welsh III)
(quoting the remarks of Representative Senner during debate over Title II, who empha-
sized that Title II would not invade personal privacy or "compel... personal or confiden-
tial relationships."); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. §10:5-5(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999) (de-
tailing New Jersey's LAD exemptions).
282. See Koppen, supra note 15, at 649 n.44, listing the 30 states that exempt private
clubs from their public accommodation statutes.
283. See Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 7, at 250-51. "[T]he private club exemption
is partially based on the customer's constitutional right to free association." Id.
284. See Arbuss, supra note 200, at 468-69 (advocating the exemption of genuine re-
ligious organizations from public accommodation statutes on the ground that they are de-
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In order to properly protect the constitutional interests of private or-
ganizations and, at the same time, exclude organizations that are, by na-
ture, public, it is imperative that exemptions be drafted clearly. Explicit
requirements in the statute will assist courts in determining whether an
organization is truly private."' Quantitative standards, such as a size re-
quirement or a percentage of applicants denied on non-discriminatory
grounds, would provide concrete qualifications that can effectively pro-
tect an organization's constitutional rights while forwarding the goal of
the statute.286
D. Unambiguous Terminology, a Statement of Legislative Intent, and the
Determination of Covered Individuals Will Coalesce to Finalize the
Statute
In addition to unequivocal definitions for public accommodation and
for private organization, the ALI or the National Conference of Com-
missioners must define all terminology clearly. Explicit, unambiguous
definitions will relieve judicial conjecture and reliance on speculation of
legislative intent during the interpretation of public accommodation stat-
utes. A further tool in ascertaining the statute's purpose is a statement
of legislative intent.288 A statement of intent on the face of the statute to
guide the courts will simplify the judiciary's interpretative task.89
signed to only serve members of one faith); see also Welsh HI, 787 F. Supp. at 1534-35 (de-
tailing legislative testimony regarding Title II).
285. See Arbuss, supra note 200, at 467-68 (contending that if exemptions for private
clubs are not precisely drawn, clubs could avoid being covered by the statute); see also su-
pra note 25 (enumerating the Landsdowne Swim Club Factors used by courts in deter-
mining whether an organization was a private club under Title II; this approach, however,
was not codified and still required a considerable amount of judicial deliberation to reach
a decision).
286. See Varela, supra note 193, at 951-53 (advocating quantitative standards for pri-
vate club exemptions). The commentator touts New York City's public accommodation
law as "a successful attempt to announce a clear policy goal and to draft responsive,
bright-line measures implementing that goal" because it contains a clear definition of a
public accommodation. See id. at 952-53. New York City amended its definition to apply
to clubs with specified quantitative qualities. See id. at 952. These include: more than 400
members, regular meal service, and regular receipt of admission payments by nonmem-
bers. See id. The statute exempts benevolent orders and religious corporations from this
test, and therefore from the statute. See id.
287. See id. at 935 (emphasizing that unequivocal definitions will provide some uni-
formity in a state's decisions). Mr. Varela notes, however, that even with explicit defini-
tions, some judges may rely on their own approach to statutory construction. See id.
288. Cf. Llewellyn, supra note 254, at 400 ("If a statute is to make sense, it must be
read in the light of some assumed purpose. A statute merely declaring a rule, with no
purpose or objective, is nonsense."). But see Varela, supra note 193, at 951-53 (advocating
that an express statement of purpose must be accompanied by clear definitions).
289. See Varela, supra note 193, at 935 (observing that some states' public accommo-
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Finally, the drafters must establish the classifications that the statute
will cover. In the interests of pursuing the goals of antidiscrimination
statutes, it would be advantageous to include as many protected classes
as possible.2 ° Only by setting an example that society will not tolerate
discrimination will progress be made in eliminating it.
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V. CONCLUSION
As demonstrated by the courts' disparate interpretations in the afore-
mentioned cases, we must refine public accommodation statutes to pro-
tect adequately against invidious discrimination. Providing state legisla-
tures with a model statute so that they may clarify their own statutes will
best achieve this goal. Such a statute must not base public accommoda-
tion on a physical site, because it is individuals who discriminate. Fur-
ther, the statute must be drafted with explicit definitions and exceptions
and include a statement of legislative intent. Creating uniformity among
the state statutes will decrease discrimination by equalizing protection
against an evil that society has targeted, but not eliminated.
dation statutes begin with a legislative statement of purpose, which simplifies the courts'
interpretative process). Other statutes are devoid of such a statement, leaving the courts
to rely on case law to "fill in the blanks." See id.
290. The coverage of public accommodation statutes is expanding. Jefferson County,
Kentucky's most populous county, recently voted to expand the coverage of its statute to
ban discrimination based on sexual orientation in employment, housing, and public ac-
commodations. See Across the USA: News from Every State, USA TODAY, Oct. 13, 1999,
at A15. Illinois also has a bill pending in the Illinois House that would add sexual orienta-
tion to the list of protected classes in its public accommodation statute. See Tim Barrett,
Southern Illinois U.: House Representative Defends Stand Concerning House Bill 474,
DAILY EGYPTIAN, October 21, 1999, available in 1999 WL 18819906.
291. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999) (stating the finding and
declaration of the legislature). The New Jersey statute states:
The Legislature finds and declares that practices of discrimination against any of
its inhabitants ... are matters of concern to the government of the State, and that
such discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of the in-
habitants of the State but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free
democratic State[.]
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